




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THE OTHER MAN'S COUNTRY

AN APPEAL TO CONSCIENCE

BY
HERBERT WELSH

*"Let us meet and question this most bloody piece of work,
to know it further"*

MACBETH, Act II. Scene III.

PHILADELPHIA
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
1900

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PREFACE



THE events which have taken place within the last few years, bringing the United States rapidly and with dramatic effect into the closest relationship with outlying tropical lands, have of necessity profoundly impressed the minds and the hearts of Americans. Questions intellectual and moral, requiring for their full comprehension and just solution not only the unaided operation of the mind but the enlightened guidance of an acute and disciplined moral sense, have been presented to us with a suddenness and an insistence most bewildering. We were startled with a commanding assurance, spoken from the seats of highest authority, that Destiny called us into wholly new and unexpected paths, and that it was our duty to follow the

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summons with prompt, unhesitating obedience. The circumstances under which that call was uttered precluded the possibility of careful examination into all the reasons and facts that had prompted it, before responsive action of some sort must be taken. Whether the voice that so spoke to us was that of a true prophet, divinely chosen, or of a false prophet trying to lead us out into the famine and the thirst of the wilderness, whence we might never return, it was hard for any man at once to determine. Some said one thing and some another. Thousands assured us that it was the voice of God which we heard, and that to question or hesitate was disobedience to His manifest providence, disloyalty to our chosen rulers, if not treason to our country. But caution in things spiritual and moral, as well as in those purely material (if, indeed, these latter can ever be wholly disassociated from the

former), is a good quality at all times, and especially during days of excitement and confusion, when currents run swift and strong towards the sea of an untried policy. An apostle himself tells us to try the spirits whether or not they be of God. Some of us began to reflect that God is Himself subject to His own laws of righteousness in the moral world as He is to those of order, harmony, and beauty in the intellectual and physical; that He has expressed His wishes for His children's guidance in the different spheres of life, through one form of revelation or another, with sufficient precision and clearness to silence the excuse, should any one offer it, that ignorance of the truth prevented obedience. We begin to understand the laws by which He governs the outside world of field and forest, flood and sky, when as children we learn to avoid its most primitive pitfalls and to

enjoy its most obvious blessings. Then our own dawning experience, or the maturer knowledge of parents, begins a tuition which may progress and broaden until in later years the searching hand of our intellect reaches out to grasp the secrets of nature's most occult forces, or discloses the mysteries of the most distant stars. All these things, according to God's plan, were ready for our use so soon as we had searched for them and found them by following faithfully those paths which God had opened for their discovery. It was the same path of experience which we began to tread in childhood.

There were some who called to mind at this national crisis a great truth which, amid eddying currents, kept their rudder true,—that God has not left man to guess His purposes in the moral world any more than in the physical. Man is not to gather from the conjunction of stars or from the

entrails of slaughtered animals what his duty is ; nor is he free to excuse a failure in doing that duty on the allegation that Destiny compelled his disobedience.

The words of an eminent British writer and man of affairs, Mr. James Bryce, although not intended to apply to American matters, are peculiarly appropriate in this connection :

“ Nations whose conscience is clear, statesmen who have foresight and insight, do not throw the blame for their failures upon Destiny. The chieftain in Homer, whose folly has brought disaster, says, ‘ It is not I who am the cause of this : it is Zeus, and Fate, and the Fury that walketh in darkness.’ ‘ It could not have been helped, anyhow,’ ‘ It was bound to come,’—phrases such as these are the last refuge of despairing incompetence.”

For God has given to man a moral law so simple yet so comprehensive

that, while it is a safe guide in determining his humblest individual acts, and regulating duties involved in the most obvious personal relationships, there is no duty so complex as not to fall easily within its scope.

The Hebrew ethical law, given thousands of years ago, and at first designed for the regulation of a primitive nomadic people, never more clearly demonstrated its serviceability than it does to-day when applied to those problems into the consideration of which a people of highly complex civilization are just entering. The ten commandments, with their few fundamental injunctions and prohibitions, as summarized by the greatest of moral teachers, require of us only love towards God and love towards man. The wine of wisdom, distilled through ages of humanity's struggles and sufferings to attain knowledge and light, offers us nothing finer than this. No Destiny

can fall upon us from sudden clouds above our heads, or rise to confront us from the earth beneath, which can rightly compel us to abate one jot or one tittle of this eternal law. If we trust it, we are safe; if we despise it, we are undone. By our obedience or disobedience to it each succeeding age with an increasing rigor will judge us, and the verdict finally passed upon our actions, and upon those of all men, we believe, will be pronounced according to the same high standard.

Considerations of constitutional right, of international law, of commercial expediency, all have a relative value, and in the discussion of the Philippine question each one of these has its place in the grave inquiry as to what national policy should be adopted towards these islands; but there is one sheaf of fine wheat outranking them all, to which all must make obeisance, —it is the law of our duty towards our

neighbor. In the Christian sense the Filipino is now our neighbor; and it is our duty to treat him not as one from whom we seek to realize a selfish profit, but as a man whose rights of every kind we are bound to respect, and whose welfare in due subordination to the law of our own being we must first consider. Many and strong have been those voices raised among us in contradiction of this idea. We have been told that we shall keep or cast off these islands, according as we may decide that they will or will not be profitable to us, and that we shall make as much gain out of them as possible. But this is the cry of the speculator, not of the American people. The final verdict of the people, it may confidently be believed, will be in favor of justice and right. When they know the full truth, then they will act, and their judgment will be substantially just.

These pages have been written, and

now are presented to the public, in the earnest hope that they may, in some small measure, contribute towards that end, and at least help some readers to an understanding of what are the real facts of this case, and what are the great fundamental principles by which the facts, when known, should be interpreted.

A word at the conclusion of this preface may be pardoned the author in explanation of his past training and place in life which have led him to attempt even this light task. Many years have been passed by him in close study of the American Indian, and of the relations of the government towards its wards. This work has not been theoretical only, but concerned with the highly practical phases of Indian protection and education. It is work which would naturally lead to an understanding of those sound principles which must form the enduring basis

of practical policy, and which would tend to create in the minds of those engaged in it some comprehension of the ideas and temper of mind of an alien race. If the writer has learned one lesson from such an experience, it is that such problems will not yield to the arbitrary commands of force. That sympathy which enables the stronger to put himself in the place of the weaker man, and so to appreciate his feelings and his difficulties,—to see things for the moment from his point of view,—is necessary to solve them. The spirit of the American people will surely feel eventually the breath of this sympathy. When it does, war in Luzon will give way to peace, and the unjust claims of a right on our part to subjugate will be replaced by a recognition of Filipino independence, and our willingness to aid the islanders in establishing their own government.

GERMANTOWN, PHILADELPHIA,

July, 1900.

THE OTHER MAN'S COUNTRY



CHAPTER I.

THE author's purpose is to present in this chapter, as briefly as would seem to be consistent with a clear understanding of the subject, an historical sketch of the last insurrection of the Filipinos against Spanish rule, and of the subsequent relations of the United States with the islands.

In order to understand the wrong done by the United States to the people of the Philippines, it is necessary to sketch briefly the facts relating to our war with Cuba, and the recent past

history of the Filipino insurrection against the inconceivably tyrannous and corrupt government of Spain.

Various currents of influence running swiftly, finally uniting into an irresistible torrent, precipitated our war with Spain. Some of those currents were pure, others turbid. It is unnecessary now to distinguish between them further than to say that one strong popular current was pure. The nation demanded that Cuba should be free, and that the hopeless rule of the mother country no longer should continue fostering a dry rot of corruption that had eaten Spain's political fabric for centuries, and which she was powerless to cure. Those under her bad colonial dominion were suffering not from her cruel sword alone, but from an arrested moral and intellectual growth which her rule entailed.

The author fully believes we might have freed Cuba by continued moral

pressure, for attempting which President McKinley is to be commended, and so have won for ourselves, and for her, a far greater good than we obtained by war. Had we been more advanced in true civilization, so as to have exercised greater self-restraint when tempted to revenge by the loss of the "Maine," it is fair to assume that we could have obtained Cuba's freedom without war. Such a crown of national glory for our brow may come out of the mist of the future. Nevertheless, we freed the island, bringing to her the blessing and to ourselves the inevitable curse of war. But we did one thing, however, distinctly good. We planted ourselves nobly before the world in the righteous purpose of that act: "Cuba is, and of right ought to be, free and independent," we said. And in so speaking we used the very words of our own Declaration of Independence. We gave a noble prom-

ise through which the voice of Adams, Washington, Lincoln, and many other of our patriots spoke, whatever we may do later to mar it or to break it. And surely the President spoke at the bidding of his good angel when he said, "I speak not of forcible annexation, for that, according to our code of morals, would be criminal aggression." That truly American word, coming from the lips of the country's Chief Magistrate, like the shots of Lexington fired for liberty on an April morning of the last century, echoed round the world. In the far East some Malay patriots struggling for the freedom of their own land heard it, and took heart again.

Just at this time, when Spain's colonial clutch tightened in death agony in Cuba, a similar state of affairs existed in the Philippines. Spain had held these islands, like those of the West Indies, more or less securely for

three centuries.* Their inhabitants number approximately eight million souls. These people may, for practical purposes, be roughly divided into two groups,—Mohammedans and Christians. The Mohammedans, under Spanish policy, fierce, savage, intractable, need not for present purposes be much considered. Spain never had much hold upon them, and never really subdued them. Until very recently, when modern repeating arms gave the Spaniards an advantage, they indulged with but little restraint in their piratical incursions. But the Tagalogs and Visayos inhabiting Luzon, Panay, Negros, Leyte, Cebu, and other northern islands, they had fairly

* “Maghallanes, or Magellan, discovered and assumed possession of the Philippine Islands in the name of Charles I. of Spain, landing at Cebu, April 7, 1521.”—“The Philippine Islands,” by John Foreman, F.R.G.S.

well assimilated. They have absorbed Christianity in the Roman Catholic form, and in many cases are well advanced in the arts of civilization. These mixed Malays are a mild, well-disposed people for the most part, though characterized by various weaknesses and peculiarities. They cultivate the fields patiently, raising sugar, tobacco, and hemp, with their slow-moving buffaloes, whom they well understand. They have many well-built towns, with well-kept streets and good houses, some of the latter being elegantly finished with finely carved native woods. The better classes have absorbed much of Spanish civilization in their three-century-old apprenticeship. They show extraordinary talent for music. The church of the mother land of Spain is much in evidence among them. It brought to them its blessings, but also incidentally a terrible curse. The mendicant orders—the

Franciscans, the Dominicans, the Augustinians, no longer poor preachers, thinking only of serving, blessing, loving men, but grown rich, domineering, and, in many cases, sadly corrupt in morals—ate up the land. They added field to field, house to house, till there was but little space left for the people. They charged enormous rents to those who to put bread in their mouths must till their fields. Just such cause for revolt existed as that which in France aroused the storm of the great revolution; the people taxed without mercy, the clergy untaxed, reaping the benefit. Had the Christ-like St. Francis of Assisi been endowed with the gift of prophetic vision to see this gross degeneracy of his followers, more than ever would he have felt the soundness of his intuition which made him set his face like flint against the acquisition of any property by his order. His beloved fair Lady of Poverty would

have seemed to him more beautiful than ever. He would have been horrified with the knowledge of the cruel rapacity of monks bearing his name, who, nevertheless, grossly oppressed the Philippine peasantry in rents and taxes,—the very poor whom St. Francis founded his order to serve.*

* The cardinal idea embodied in the rule first promulgated by St. Francis for his followers is described in Paul Sabatier's "Life of St. Francis d'Assisi" as follows :

"One day, it was probably the 24th of February, 1209, the feast of S. Matthias, mass was celebrated at Portionculo. When the priest turned towards him to read the words of Jesus, Francis felt himself seized by a profound disquiet. He saw the priest no longer ; it was Jesus himself, the Crucified of St. Damien, who said to him, 'Everywhere upon your way preach and say, The kingdom of heaven is nigh. Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, cast out demons. Freely you have received, freely give. Take neither gold, nor silver, nor money in your girdle ; neither bag, nor two cloaks, nor

Perhaps the most deep-seated cause of Filipino insurrection against Spanish authority was this unchecked growth of ignorant, cruel, and oppressive ecclesiasticism. It was this which weighed most heavily upon the people. It made the mere question of gaining a livelihood difficult, but especially did it strangle intellectual and moral growth. It not only oppressed the Filipinos, but it overawed and dominated the Spanish authorities. It was the power of the mendicant orders which drove out the just Condé de Caspe, and later the well-disposed and

sandals, nor staff, for the workman is worthy of his food.'

"These words fell upon him as a revelation; as a reply from heaven to all his sighs and preoccupation of spirit. 'This is what I want,' he exclaimed. 'This it is I seek, and from this day I will apply myself with all my strength to put this into practice.' "

clement Blanco, which stimulated and supported the frightful atrocities of the cruel Polavieja during the revolution of 1896. Archbishop Nozaleda, a Spanish monk of the Dominican order, was a leader in urging wholesale and often wholly unjustifiable arrests, which were succeeded by the torture and execution of hundreds of persons.*

It is difficult for a mind reared in the freedom and culture of modern Europe, or still freer America, to realize the horrible excesses and actual mediæval cruelties which were committed in the prisons of Manila and elsewhere in the islands upon Filipino insurgents, or those accused of being in league with them, during the revolution of 1896. The actual story of these things as it is unfolded, not only from Filipino sources, but from the Spanish archives of Manila, is like a

* See Appendix, Note I.

scene evoked from the long-buried and forgotten past in the middle ages. Indeed, the only intelligible interpretation of events which cast shame on the name of Spanish authority and Spanish Christianity is found by reflecting that affairs in the Philippines, just previous to the battle of Manila, were controlled by ideas and forces which existed generally in Europe previous to the reformation,—ideas which slowly retreated before the dawn of the new learning and the liberation of the individual conscience. But not until the fierce storm of the French Revolution shook Europe did many of these mediæval ideas and abuses perish, leaving the soil free to bring forth better growth.

An instance of the barbarous and inhuman methods practised by Spain against the Filipinos is given in an excellent article by Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Calkins, U.S.N., which

appeared in *Harper's Monthly* for August, 1899. It is as follows :

“In Blanco's time only two batches of unimportant rebels were shot in Manila. Other prisoners perished, however. Spanish chronicles relate that some fifty odd died over night in the ‘asphyxiating dungeons’ of Fort Santiago at this season. The details of this Black Hole of Manila may be mercifully omitted. The inquisitorial system of military justice requires strict *incommunica-tion* for the ‘necessary diligences’ in the manufacture of evidence. This was secured in the thronged prison of Bilibid by attaching five prisoners by the foot, star-wise around each pillar, with the sentry ready to shoot the first man attempting to speak. The jail-bird historian seems to rejoice in enumerating men of position and education confined in this position.”

The Philippine Islands, where Spanish rule was complete and undisputed, furnished an asylum for ecclesiastical despotism and rapacity, and for a slightly less baneful civil power which

elsewhere had long vanished from the modern world. As the glacier of remote mountain fastnesses is a survival of the ice age,—the last record of conditions which once existed over vast areas,—so what lived on in Luzon, and other northern Philippine Islands, of brutal absolutism, of unbridled tyranny, and terribly cruel punishments, was a unique survival of those distorted ideas which once found their greatest power to afflict humanity in Spain, and were more or less general over Europe. But, bad as things were, they were not quite hopeless. Spain brought the comforts and adornments of her civilization to the islands, and Latin Christianity had its brighter and better side. Many of the people certainly gained much benefit from both sources. It was growth up to a certain point,—intellectual, moral, spiritual,—and then the stoppage of further growth. The native plant, under the

opportunities offered it, the meagre nourishment, grudgingly bestowed, craved further development, but was denied it, while all the time the cruel parasite preyed upon its slight vitality. It should also be remembered that the severe condemnation, justly made upon the cruel bigotry and rapacity of that power which the mendicant orders exercised, does not at all apply to the order of Jesuits, who did much for the education, enlightenment, and general improvement of the people.

But into these anomalous conditions were gradually introduced fresh elements that acted as powerful stimulants to the quick growth of new life. The results were of necessity tragic. To escape a cataclysm was impossible. Many of the more intelligent young Filipinos, sprung from families wealthy enough to grant their children such advantages, found their way into the fresh, pure air of the outer world,—

the world of modern ambitions, of activity, of healthful intellectual friction, of learning, science, and art. Some studied in the University of Madrid or graduated from other universities of Europe. Among this class was José Rizal, a man of marked talent, ambitious for his own advancement, but still further moved by high, pure aspirations for the enfranchisement of his oppressed countrymen, and for the prosecution of reforms, so greatly demanded in the islands. Rizal, upon his return to Manila, and after having concluded his medical studies abroad, was the object of the malignant hatred of the friars. They instinctively felt that he represented a force hostile to their interests. He was arrested, and ultimately sentenced to a four years' term of banishment in the island of Mindanao. There was however, nothing against him which would have had the slightest weight

in a free country. His efforts were confined to moderate and reasonable propositions of reform, such as relief for his countrymen from the ruinous taxation of the friars, and an inquiry into the title-deeds of their establishments. But his attitude, moderate though it was, sufficed to make the friars feel that he was a dangerous enemy. During his banishment Rizal was the object of constant visits from persons needing his professional services. Among these pilgrims came an American gentleman from Hong Kong, accompanied by his daughter, on whose care the father was dependent. His eyesight was too far gone to render a cure possible. Rizal and this young American girl fell in love with one another, and were subsequently married. The union, so far as this world is concerned, was brief and its ending tragic. Rizal, finding that the hostility of the friars towards him was

so great that his life would not be safe in the islands, obtained permission from General Blanco to enter the medical force of the Spanish army, for service in Cuba. He had already started for his destination when the vessel on which he had embarked stopped en route at Manila. There Rizal, who was the idol of the Filipino populace, was made the object of a great demonstration. This, coming, as it did, at the same time with various outrages that had been committed by the people, but for which Rizal was in no way responsible, led to his arrest, trial, condemnation on false charges, and finally to his execution. He was shot on the Lunetta, in Manila, at dawn, December 30, 1896. He died a true martyr to liberty, if any such are to be found in the world's history.* His widow entered the insurgent ranks and

* See Appendix, Note II.

fought bravely as any soldier could have done against the Spaniards. It was from such tragic events that the spirit of nationality and independence was born among the Filipinos.

Alongside of the martyred Rizal, as a hero in the popular mind, stands Emilio Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo was the son of a captain in the Spanish army. All reliable testimony points to him as a man of honest and sincere character, deeply patriotic, indifferent to the temptations of wealth. Although not highly educated, as Rizal, his ability and force of character were generally conceded. Like Rizal, he seems to have been at all times earnestly opposed to cruel treatment of prisoners and non-combatants. This is the more remarkable considering the frightful atrocities—some of them too horrible in their nature to be written down—which were perpetrated by the Spaniards. The struggles of the Filipino

insurgents in the field during the uprising of 1896 need not be given here in detail. They occasioned much slaughter of the natives by the Spaniards, and witnessed some successes gained by the natives.

Aguinaldo became the principal figure of the revolution. His name, as one of our war correspondents has since said, was one "to conjure with." But the revolution finally exhausted itself, and was ended for a time by the promise of certain reforms by General Rivera on the part of Spain, and the withdrawal from the islands of Aguinaldo and seventeen of his associates. Rivera promised to the banished insurgent chiefs eight hundred thousand dollars in silver, the full amount of which, he stated in his report to the Spanish Government, he did not find it convenient to pay. Nor were the reforms that had been guaranteed ever carried out. This transaction has been

alluded to as involving a "bribe for peace;" but the phrase is misleading, and does an injustice to Aguinaldo and his associates. The money so received cannot be justly considered a bribe. It was not used personally by the leaders who received it, nor did it involve the betrayal of a cause.* These funds

* Lieutenant-Commander Calkins speaks of this transaction as follows :

"The treaty of Biaknabato was a secret compact, and no attested copy thereof is available for discussion, but its general provisions are well known. Aguinaldo was to disband his forces and to give up his arms; he and other leaders were to go into exile, pledged to refrain from rebellion against Spain. . . . The Governor-Général promised complete amnesty and a programme of reforms, including most of those demanded by the rebels, the expulsion of the friars among them. *Three successive Governors-General were thus committed to this measure, but the rebellious orders were still unconquered.* [Editor's italics.] Other stipulations provided for representative councils

were deposited in bank in Hong Kong, and only released and used for the purchase of arms when the Spanish authorities had failed to carry out the reforms promised, and when Admiral Dewey and Consul-General Pratt, acting apparently under instructions from, or a tacit understanding with, the United States Government in Washington, entered upon an agreement with Aguinaldo and his associates to lift again the standard of revolt in the archipelago and drive out the feeble Spanish rule still existing.

In support of this assertion, it is

and for the payment of a sum of money,—\$1,600,000 seems the figure promised,—for distribution among the troops and officers of the insurrection.

“Under the provision of this treaty, Aguinaldo and thirty-six other leaders were transported to Hong Kong, and there an instalment of the promised fund was placed to their account.”

interesting to read a message from Consul Williams to Secretary Day, dated Manila, May 24, 1898. It is as follows :

“To-day I executed a power of attorney whereby General Aguinaldo releases to his attorneys in fact four hundred thousand dollars, now in bank in Hong Kong, so that money therefrom can pay for three thousand stands of arms bought there and expected here to-morrow.”

Consul Williams wrote Mr. Moore, of the State Department, July 18, 1898, from Hong Kong :

“There has been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Aguinaldo and his cabinet, on account of the questionable terms of their surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month. *It has been said that they sold their country for gold; but this has been conclusively disproved* [Editor's italics] not only by their own statements, but by the speech of the late Governor-General Rivera in the Spanish Senate, June 11, 1898. He said that Aguinaldo undertook to sub-

mit if the Spanish Government would give a certain sum to the widows and orphans of the insurgents. He then admits that only a tenth part of this sum was ever given to Aguinaldo, and that other promises made he did not find it convenient to keep. . . . Only four hundred thousand dollars, Mexican, was ever placed to their credit in the banks."

Consul Wildman gives this further testimony as to the behavior of Aguinaldo after he had returned to Luzon under Admiral Dewey's orders to carry on war against the Spaniards :

"He, of course, organized a government of which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he hoped to maintain control over the natives, and from that date until the present time he has been uninterruptedly successful in the field, and dignified and just as the head of his government. . . . He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Consul Williams, and his own Junta here in Hong Kong, and nothing of any moment has occurred which would lead any one to believe

that he was not carrying out to the letter the promises made to me in this consulate.”
“The insurgents are fighting for freedom, for freedom from the Spanish rule, and rely upon the well-known sense of justice that controls all the actions of our government as to their future.” (Editor’s italics.)

After the deportation of the insurgent chiefs, and before the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey, which occurred May 1, 1898, spasmodic rebellion again broke out in Luzon and other islands. This brief period was not one of unbroken peace. But for this continuance of trouble, Spanish chronic incapacity, and inability to adopt any settled methods of conciliation and reform, were to blame. Some seventy Filipino sailors, in a resort in Manila, discussing politics too boisterously, were shot down indiscriminately by the police. This outrage is described by Mr. John Foreman as follows :

“On the 25th of March, the tragedy of the Calle de Camba took place. This street lies just off the Calle de San Fernando, in Binondo, a few hundred yards from the river. In a house frequented by seafaring men a large number of Visayan sailors had assembled, and were, naturally, discussing the topics of the day with the warmth of expression and phraseology peculiar to their race, when a passer-by, who overheard their talk, informed the police. The Civil Guard at once raided the premises, accused these sailors of conspiracy, and, without waiting for proof or refutation, shot down all who could not escape. The victims of this outrage numbered over seventy ; the news dismayed the native population ; the fact could no longer be doubted that a reign of terrorism and revenge had been initiated with impunity, under the assumption that the rebellion was broken for many a year to come. How the particulars of this crime were related by the survivors to their fellow-islanders we cannot know ; but it is a coincidental fact that only now the flame of rebellion spread to the southern island of Cebu.”

It is not necessary even to sketch the cruelties and excesses which were

committed on both sides, except to note that, while some frightful atrocities were undoubtedly indulged in by the Filipino rebels, there is no evidence from any source which does not show Aguinaldo conducting the war humanely, and exerting his influence for the just treatment of Spanish prisoners.

CHAPTER II.

AND now the United States enters upon this troubled scene. The President has availed himself of many opportunities afforded in messages to Congress, public speeches, and the press, firmly to implant the conviction in the mind of the country that the Philippine Islands "fell into our lap" unexpectedly, and by a direct act of Providence. The sudden and startling nature of the events through which we were passing, the reverent spirit of the mass of our people, and the authoritative source of this statement, caused it to be generally accepted without question. But the discovery of hidden testimony, and the grouping of isolated facts which at first seemed to be without special sig-

nificance, has greatly modified this view. Evidence has since come to light showing that the administration must have known in advance that the Philippine archipelago would fall into our lap upon the capture of Manila. It is now clear that an event which the President has ascribed to a mysterious dispensation of Providence—an event quite unexpected by us—was brought about through the maturing of plans that had been set on foot and approved by the two leading representatives of the United States in the Orient, Admiral Dewey and Consul-General Pratt. This is a startling discovery for trusting minds to make. The administration's ways, truly, are more mysterious than those which the administration has ascribed to Providence!

President McKinley in a speech delivered in Boston, February 16, 1899, said:

“The Philippines were intrusted to our hands by the Providence of God. It is a trust we have not sought.”

Admiral Dewey cabled to the Navy Department from Hong Kong, March 31, 1898,—

“There is every reason to believe that with Manila taken, or even blockaded, the rest of the islands would fall either to the insurgents or to ourselves.”

This despatch was published for the first time January 14, 1900, having been sent to the Senate by special request. Since the authorities had this despatch in their possession, they must have known that by the fall of Manila the islands would become our property, especially if we prevented the insurgents from holding them. This disposes of the President's assertion that they came to us unexpectedly, since Dewey's despatch was sent one month before the battle of Manila.

The arrangement made with Aguinaldo by Consul-General Pratt at a series of secret meetings in Singapore on and near April 24, 1898, whereby the Filipinos, under Aguinaldo's lead, were to make war against the Spanish rule in the islands, was formulated with sufficient precision and clearness to leave no doubt as to its meaning. We are left in no doubt as to what advantage Aguinaldo and his people expected in return for their service, and for the great risks they ran. The statement of this understanding now forms a part of the record of the State Department. Aguinaldo said he would be contented with the same terms that had been offered Cuba. The terms offered Cuba were defined and comprised in a declaration setting forth the right of the Cubans to liberty. This involved, of course, a temporary intervention on our part, which was necessary for the pacification of the

island, before the fulfilment of our promise. Aguinaldo clearly stated during this meeting that he expected "independence."*

Mr. John Barrett, in an article on "The Truth of the Philippine Situation," published in the *Review of Reviews* for July, 1899, gives an interesting account of how well Aguinaldo kept his pledge to organize a provisional government for the Philippine Islands, maintain order, discipline, etc. He says :

"After his arrival at Cavité he organized with wonderful rapidity a provisional government, and in a short time had an army which was capturing Spanish outposts with the frequency of trained regulars. Within thirty days after his arrival he had taken over 2000 Spanish prisoners, and had practically gained control of all the country of Luzon outside of Manila, leaving that city

* For detailed statement, see Appendix, Note III.

to our mercy. During the latter part of May and all of June, before the arrival of our troops, his relations with our forces were most agreeable. There seemed to be no friction. There was perfect understanding between Admiral Dewey and himself, although the former was careful to avoid formal recognition. No matter what estimate may be made of Aguinaldo's personal character, there is no reason why truthful credit should not be given for what he actually did. Coming to Manila at nearly the same time, I witnessed the beginning as well as the development of his authority. Such able newspaper men as Mr. Stickney, Mr. Harden, Mr. McCutcheon, and Mr. Egan, who also saw what happened then, will confirm my simple statement of facts, as will also Consul Williams.

"The impression went abroad among the masses of people that Aguinaldo had arrived to establish an independent government, and that the Americans would assist him. The actual working of his government under the guns of our ships was sufficient evidence to them of our approval. From one end of Luzon to the other spread the report that Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, the exiled leader of the former revolution, had

returned to his home under the protection of the ships of a nation called America, which had gone to war with Spain and would give them freedom and independence at once. These influences had a tremendous effect. Before Aguinaldo had been in Cavité a month he not only had more soldiers than he could arm, but contributions of large sums of money, with unlimited amounts of rice and other raw food supplies brought in by the people for the support of his army.

* * * * *

“The government which was organized by Aguinaldo at Cavité and continued first at Bakoor and later at Malolos developed into a much more elaborate affair than its most ardent supporters had originally expected. By the middle of October, 1898, he had assembled at Malolos a congress of 100 men who would compare in behavior, manner, dress, and education with the average men of the better classes of other Asiatic nations, possibly including the Japanese. These men, whose sessions I repeatedly attended, conducted themselves with great decorum, and showed a knowledge of debate and parliamentary law that would not compare unfavorably with the Japanese Parlia-

ment. The executive portion of the government was made up of a ministry of bright men who seemed to understand their respective positions. Each general division was subdivided with reference to practical work. There was a large force of under secretaries and clerks, who appeared to be kept very busy with routine work.

“The army, however, of Aguinaldo was the marvel of his achievements. He had over 20 regiments of comparatively well-organized, well-drilled, and well-dressed soldiers, carrying modern rifles and ammunition. I saw many of these regiments executing not only regimental but battalion and company drill with a precision that astonished me. Certainly as far as dress was concerned the comparison with the uniform of our soldiers was favorable to the Filipinos. They were officered largely, except in the higher positions, with young men who were ambitious to win honors, and were not merely show fighters. The people in all the different towns took great pride in this army. Nearly every family had a father, son, or cousin in it. Wherever they went they aroused enthusiasm for the Filipino cause. The impression made upon the inhabitants of the interior by such dis-

plays can be readily appreciated. Aguinaldo and his principal lieutenants also made frequent visits to the principal towns, and were received with the same earnestness that we show in greeting a successful President.

“Along with the army there was a Red Cross association, at the head of which were Aguinaldo's mother and wife. There were quartermaster and commissariat departments which were well equipped, in view of the lack of experience of the men in charge. The American who thinks for a moment that we were or have been fighting a disorganized force labors under great error. It would be difficult to imagine the army of any European country being in better shape to fight us than that of Aguinaldo at the time of the outbreak on February 4, with the conditions of climate and country favoring them.”

A word further regarding the Singapore conference.

It seems almost incredible that so important a fact should not have come to the knowledge of Admiral Dewey, Messrs. Denby, Worcester, and Schur-

man, the members of the Philippine Commission. But it would seem that these gentlemen were ignorant of what had happened, for they state in their preliminary report, issued on the eve of the Ohio election, that the idea of Philippine independence "first arose" when Admiral Dewey ordered Aguinaldo to remove his camp from Cavité to Bacoor. This occurred towards the close of June, 1898, about two months after the time when Aguinaldo had presented that idea definitely to the world. Nor is this the only misleading statement which appears in the Peace Commissioners' report, or which contradicts what the Commissioners, as individuals, have said on other occasions, or what we know to be true from other reliable testimony. For example, the report says, "Deplorable as war is, the one in which we are now engaged was unavoidable by us," while Admiral Dewey states, in an

interview with the *Washington Star* (a paper which supports the administration), that the war could have been avoided had General Leonard Wood, or a man like him, been in command. There are other discrepancies which will at once be apparent to every one who carefully compares this document with the actual facts of the case that have been established by valid evidence. The impartial mind is forced to the conclusion that the signers must have attached their signatures without reading carefully what the report contained, and that whoever may have been charged with the preparation of the report must have felt himself obliged to stretch facts beyond the limits of strict accuracy in order to meet the exigencies of an exacting political situation.

Some important statements of fact made in the report of the Peace Commission—statements which are evi-

dently intended to impress the mind of the reader with a view favorable to the President's policy—are sharply contradicted by the official evidence contained in Senate Document No. 62. These, when read in the light of that testimony, convey a totally different impression from that given by the report. Let us cite examples. The report states :

“It was decided to allow Aguinaldo to come to Cavité on board the ‘McCulloch.’ He was allowed to land at Cavité and organize an army. . . . No alliance of any kind was entered into with Aguinaldo.”

Would the uninformed reader gather from such statements that our consul, E. Spencer Pratt, had sought Aguinaldo out at Singapore and had urged him strongly to do the very things the report is careful to inform us he was “allowed” to do,—suggestions promptly and gladly accepted by Ad-

miral Dewey? We are told that no "alliance of any kind was entered into" by our forces with Aguinaldo. What is an alliance? Among other things, it is a union of interests between States or persons for the accomplishment of a definite purpose. It is not claimed that this was an alliance in which there was a formal and written compact. It was not that. But that it was an alliance morally, which brought both parties to it under moral obligations, would seem quite clear from the evidence. There was a real union and co-operation between our forces and those of Aguinaldo for the overthrow of Spanish power. The Filipinos rendered valuable services to that end. Is there not evidence of a very real alliance in the following despatch from Admiral Dewey to Secretary Long, June 27, 1898?

"I have given Aguinaldo to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, *being*

opposed to a common enemy. [Italics ours.] He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming *a civil government.* [Italics ours.] Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water, recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have frequently advised to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably."

What sort of a relationship does General Greene's memorandum on the Philippines, September 30, 1898, show, if not an alliance?

"The United States Government, through its naval commander, has to some extent made use of them [the Filipinos] for a distinct military purpose—viz., to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our troops."

And so successful was this alliance in accomplishing its purpose that the Commissioners themselves admit that "the Filipino forces made themselves masters of the entire island except that city (Manila)." It was natural and fair that Aguinaldo should at least infer as the result of the secret conference with Consul-General Pratt at Singapore that the overthrow of Spanish power in Luzon would result in promises to the Filipinos similar to those made the Cubans. What inducement to him could there have been to make the venture had he known that we would demand a subjugation of the island without giving definite political status to its people? The report further states :

"Now for the first time arose the idea of independence." [Italics ours.]

After Aguinaldo had been brought to Cavité and ordered to move his

head-quarters thence to Bacoor, the implication would seem to be that pique at being pushed back made him grasp at independence from the Americans, when otherwise he would have accepted our absolute sovereignty. But whatever may be the purpose of the Commission, the statement is grossly erroneous. Senate Document 62, pages 343 and 344, gives a detailed account of what took place at the secret interview held in Singapore between "Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo y Fami" and Consul E. Spencer Pratt. The account is contained in the *Singapore Free Press*, Wednesday, May 4, and this is vouched for as "substantially correct" in a despatch to the State Department from E. Spencer Pratt. At this "conference," at which Mr. Bray acted as interpreter, General Aguinaldo explained to the American Consul-General "the nature of the co-operation he could give, in which he, in the event of the

American forces from the squadron landing and taking possession of Manila, *would guarantee to maintain* order and discipline among the native troops and inhabitants in the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the war. . . . He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles, and *would be willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United States intend giving Cuba.* The Consul-General of the United States, *coinciding with the general views expressed during the discussion* [italics ours], placed himself at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral Dewey at Hong Kong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a constant interchange of telegrams took place."

The article concludes with a definite statement of Aguinaldo's policy. Let it be remembered that this statement was published to the world May 4, 1898, or nearly two months before the time when the Commission states that "then for the first time arose the idea of national independence." The statement of policy is as follows :

“General Aguinaldo’s policy embraces *the independence* [italies ours] of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrial population of the country. There would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judicature of the country under experienced European law officers,” etc.

The above is a clear, unequivocal statement of an independent government, contemplated and published to the world. It neatly punctures the Commission’s statement that such an idea did not arise until long afterwards, and under circumstances which would seem to throw discredit on the purpose of the insurgent leader in announcing it. We are told later :

“Nor was there any *co-operation* of any kind between the contending respective forces, and the relations between the two forces were strained from the beginning.”

Then why did General Anderson write from Cavité Arsenal, July 4, 1898, to “Don Emilio Aguinaldo, commanding Philippine forces,” that the United States, being at war with the kingdom of Spain,

“has the most friendly sentiments for the people of the Philippine Islands, and for these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people *co-operate* [italics ours] *with us in military operations against the Spanish forces*” ?

This proves conclusively that co-operation was desired by us. To this letter Aguinaldo replied in the most friendly spirit. Now, what is the testimony as to the actual existence and value of this Filipino co-operation,

which was so eagerly desired? General Charles A. Whittier testified to some important facts before the Paris Peace Commission, which the Commission have not thought fit to lay before the country—at least in their “preliminary” report.

General Whittier testified:

“Our consul offered that chief [Aguinaldo] money for his expenses; the offer was declined.”

General Whittier further states that on the first day after Aguinaldo's arrival at Cavité, as followers did not flock to his standard, he was discouraged, and would have returned to Hong Kong. “I think Dewey advised him to make another effort.” After furnishing the insurgents with arms and ammunition, he adds:

“From that time the military operations and the conduct of the insurgents have been

most creditable. Positions taken and the movements of troops show great ability on the part of some leaders. . . . His forces [Aguinaldo's] went around the city, taking the water-works and the north point of the city, and running up the railroad. . . . At that time they occupied a portion of Manila. We soon demanded that they should give that up, to which Aguinaldo's representatives agreed."

The Peace Commission asked General Whittier the direct question :

"Were they of material assistance to us?"

The answer was :

"Very great. . . . I think if they [the Spaniards] had not had this experience of having been driven back into the city [by the natives] and the water cut off, so that even Jaudenes said he could not remove his non-combatants, the government would have insisted on his making a fight, and he would have made a very good one, for his position was strong, if they had any fight

in them at all. But every place had been taken from them by the Filipinos, who managed their advances and occupation of the country in an able manner."

Another illustration of the unjudicial nature of the report, and so of its unreliability in certain important respects, is found in its treatment of the causes of the war between the United States and the Filipinos. The report treats elaborately the insolence of the natives and the provocations put upon our men by them, but fails to treat or to explain the vital cause of these irritations, and finally of a tension which provoked the outbreak. This was the proclamation of President McKinley ordering the extension of our military control over the island of Luzon seven weeks in advance of the ratification of the treaty. This act, unconstitutional as it was, virtually declared war on the Filipinos, unless they were willing to abandon the ex-

periment in self-government they had already begun, and which for six months held peaceful control of almost the entire island.

Another illustration of unfair dealing with a grave matter is found in the emphasis laid by the Commission on the "obduracy" of Aguinaldo in continuing forcible resistance, and in refusing even to outline terms which might be compared with the terms offered, or with the concessions which the superior power might be willing to make. The Commission might have found the satisfactory explanation of this obduracy in an article recently published in the *Outlook* by one of its own members, Dr. Schurman, who says that when the Commissioners stated to the Filipinos the terms the President was willing to offer (and these fell far short of what they desired), "*the shrewd Filipinos immediately made the point that under the*

Constitution of the United States only Congress could determine their political status ; that whatever powers the President exercised were the war powers of the Constitution, which ceased with the establishment of peace." [Italics ours.]

A reply showing considerable appreciation of constitutional government, which Dr. Schurman was evidently forced to admire, and which exposed cleverly the weakness of the President in failing to convene Congress, so that a stable basis for the negotiations of the contending forces might be effected.

Let us glance at one or two more propositions of the report which are equally vulnerable.

"Never in the worst days of Spanish rule had the people been so badly taxed or worse governed."

This refers to the Filipino provisional government. Let the sincere

student of the question turn from this astonishing statement first to the record of "the worst days of Spanish rule," and then to the report of Admiral Dewey's representatives in a journey of six hundred miles through Luzon, October and November, 1898, when the provisional Filipino government held the island under its control for six months.

The former period shows horrible barbarities. Consul Williams reports, March 31, 1898:

"On Friday, March 25, a church and legal holiday, unarmed natives were holding a meeting near my consulate. The meeting was surrounded by the police and suspicious military, the meeting broken up, twelve natives shot to death, several wounded, and sixty-two prisoners taken, certain of whom were passers-by, not having attended the meeting. The next morning these sixty-two prisoners, without form of trial, were marched in a body to the cemetery and all shot to death. Hardly a day

passes without such scenes of Middle Age treachery and barbarity."

Now, for contrast, turn again to the testimony of General Whittier :

"Their conduct to their Spanish prisoners has been deserving of the praise of all the world. With hatred of priests and Spaniards, fairly held on account of the conditions before narrated, and with every justification to a savage mind of the most brutal revenge, I have heard of no instance of torture, murder, or brutality since we have been in the country."

But stronger still is the testimony of Wilcox and Sargent. They travelled unprotected, through an immense extent of insurgent country, among a contented people, who treated them with every kindness. The one thing of which they had to complain was dinners too rich and elaborate. They mention as an exception a single instance of complaint of taxes, and that proceeded from a single family. Span-

ish prisoners in good condition were paraded for their inspection. Peace everywhere prevailed. A military officer resigned his position in the town of Aparri upon information supposed to be authentic that the Paris Peace Commission would grant the Filipinos independence under an American protectorate. A civil officer elected by the people takes his oath of office, declaring to his fellow-countrymen and hearers that, sooner than abandon their dearly bought independence to any intruding power, men, women, and children will shed the last drop of blood in resistance.

What is the meaning of such tragic, pathetic facts as these—authentic facts, which the report of the Commission has so studiously kept back from the public, while others, tending to the discredit of this unhappy people, have been given, some of which, as has been shown, seriously misrepresent the

truth? There is, indeed, a strange absence of the judicial spirit in this report—a strange failure to present, along with the weaknesses and shortcomings of this race, emerging from terrible oppression, the many admirable qualities and the large services rendered us with which the Filipinos should be credited. But, what is worse, there is a complete suppression of our own blunders and our sad failure to be true to the disinterested motives and lofty purposes which prescribed the limits of our attitude towards Cuba.

The report lays strong emphasis upon the irritations put upon the Filipinos by our soldiers previous to the outbreak of actual hostilities upon the 4th of February, 1898, but no allusion is made to the fact that we had violated our understanding with our allies, or that the chiefs had been treated with the least possible show of respect by

us after we had reaped the fruit of their service, or that the President had issued an unconstitutional proclamation, December 21, 1898, declaring United States sovereignty over the islands before the ratification of the Treaty of Paris gave to him even a technical right to do so. Truly, acts such as these,—the violations of a clearly expressed understanding, the betrayal of the confidence of allies who have rested their hopes upon our honor,—the great truths enunciated in our own Declaration of Independence, and before all the significant events of our past history, were sufficient to account for the resentment and violent acts of the Filipinos. They felt that our treatment of them involved perfidy to our own standards and to the dictates of honor. Our action was virtually a declaration of war against the newly-formed Filipino government.

Even a superficial examination of the consular and other reports issued by the State and Navy Departments makes this important fact clear: in the early stages of our relationship with the Filipinos our representatives in the East, Admiral Dewey, Consul-General Pratt, Consuls Wildman and Williams, evidently supposed, judging from the tone of their despatches and reports, that our treatment of the Filipinos was to be the same as that which we had guaranteed the Cubans. While probably no precise promises were made to Aguinaldo further than the assurance given him by Consul-General Pratt that he might rely on the honor of the United States, our acceptance of his services after the clear statement on his part of what requital he expected, constitutes, in the sphere of moral obligation, a promise of the most binding nature. Our failure to meet that obligation,

or even to give the slightest indication of a desire to meet it, at once rendered us guilty of a most serious breach of faith. A further observation of official despatches reveals this significant fact: the inquiries of the authorities in Washington made of their representatives in the Philippines are at no time concerned with the question of the fitness of the natives for self-government, nor of means best suited to minister to the welfare of the Filipinos, as would naturally have been the case had our object been that which we professed on entering the Spanish war. They relate wholly to the material riches and advantages of the islands, with an evident view to the benefit the United States will derive from them. The confusion and discrepancies existing between many of Admiral Dewey's statements, as well as of the other Peace Commissioners in the earlier stages of our

operations and those later on, are apparently to be accounted for by this fact: it was necessary to trim the sails afresh to suit a new breeze. Admiral Dewey informs the world that he never treated Aguinaldo "as an ally except to make use of him to drive out the Spaniards." One might inquire, What other use is usually made of allies in war?

Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson, U.S.V., in an article published by the *North American Review* for February, 1900, waiving the question as to what precise verbal promises were made to Aguinaldo, says:

"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, and Williams did, or did not, give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than their statements. If an incipient rebellion was already in progress, what could be in-

ferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval vessel and landed in Cavité?" . . . "I believe we came to the parting of the ways when we refused their request to leave their military force in good strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with Spain without a guarantee of independence." . . .

"There were other causes of antagonism, our soldiers to get what they called trophies, did a good deal of what the Filipinos called looting. A number made debts which they did not find it convenient to pay. They called the natives 'niggers,' and often treated them with a good-natured condescension which exasperated the natives all the more because they feared to resent it." . . .

"One of Aguinaldo's Commission, who was subsequently a member of his cabinet, said to me : 'Either we have a *de facto* government, or we have not. If we have, why not recognize the fact? If not, why have you recognized us at all?' This last remark referred to General Merritt's conceding them the control of the Manila Water-Works, and to General Otis's attempts to negotiate with them without committing himself."

General Anderson refers to Aguinaldo's inquiry as to whether we intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies: "I said I could not answer that, but in twenty years we had established no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: 'I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no authority for colonies, and I have no fear.'" General Anderson adds: "It may seem that my answer was somewhat evasive, but at that time I was trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, carts, fuel, and forage."

General Anderson also states that Admiral Dewey did not realize, until he told him of it, that a current of sentiment was running in the United States towards the retention of the islands. Doubtless the administration, seated in Washington, or taking a palace-car journey in the West, felt

the force of that current also. This would seem to furnish one rational explanation of why a war begun for the purpose of giving peace, order, and liberty to Cuba changed into a war which has given to the Philippines up to this moment arbitrary rule, war, and anarchy. It is this, in default of some better explanation, which must account for the shameful sacrifice of American principles, of faith, honor, and justice which this year of carnage has witnessed.

Errors of fact are not confined alone to the Philippine Commission's report. President McKinley, in his third annual message to Congress, repeated a charge against the Filipinos that had frequently been exploded. He said :

“An order of the insurgent government was issued to its adherents who had remained in Manila, of which General Otis justly observes that ‘for barbarous intent

it is unequalled in modern times.' It directs that at eight o'clock on the night of the 15th of February the 'territorial militia' shall come together in the streets of San Pedro, armed with their bolos, with guns and ammunition, where convenient; that Filipino families only shall be respected, but that all other individuals, of whatever race they may be, shall be exterminated without any compassion, after the extermination of the army of occupation, and adds: 'Brothers, we must avenge ourselves on the Americans and exterminate them, that we may take our revenge for the infamies and treacheries which they have committed upon us. Have no compassion upon them; attack with vigor.' A copy of this fell, by good fortune, into the hands of our officers, and they were able to take measures to control the rising, which was actually attempted on the night of February 22, a week later than was originally contemplated. Considerable numbers of armed insurgents entered the city by water-ways and swamps, and in concert with confederates inside attempted to destroy Manila by fire. They were kept in check during the night, and the next day driven out of the city with heavy loss."

The evidence so far produced seems insufficient to prove that the alleged plot to massacre is more than one of rumors, subsequently shown to be false, that circulated periodically in Manila, and which probably originated with the friars. Aguinaldo's course has invariably been a humane one, unsullied by massacres. It is, therefore, highly improbable that he would sanction the folly of a diabolical plot to slaughter all foreigners located at Manila. Nor could anything be gained thereby. Aguinaldo knew perfectly well that it would give his government such a reputation for barbarism that he could not expect it to be sustained.

The Filipinos were in full possession of Iloilo at the time for which this massacre was alleged to have been arranged, and yet not one of the many foreigners there—among them Americans—was molested; nor did there

seem to be the slightest danger. If wholesale slaughter had been the policy of the insurgents, it is not likely that a city over which they had absolute control would have been spared from the sword.

Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Calkins, U.S.N., an officer of Dewey's fleet, in an article on "The Filipino Leaders," published in *Ainslee's Magazine* for May, 1900, says in regard to these rumors:

"The legend of the Katipunan includes a series of documents directing 'the assassination of all Spaniards' or other foreigners. Efforts have been made to associate schemes of plunder and murder with every political movement among the natives. It is useless to attempt the destruction of ancient myths while the original shop is still open for the supply of new ones, but it is plain that the artist's name is generally uncertain. The attribution of a futile proclamation of savage instinct to men distinguished for intelligence and practical

humanity is an unworthy device characteristic of Spanish tyranny in the Philippines."

In the same article Lieutenant-Commander Calkins says of Aguinaldo in this connection :

"He has never been convicted of corruption or cruelty. His treatment of Spanish prisoners was humane and even generous compared with that which Spain has given her rebels in any civil contest of the nineteenth century. In July, 1898, many prisoners captured by the American forces were placed in his custody."

Some light is thrown on the source of these incendiary rumors and documents charged against the Filipinos in a statement made before the United States Peace Commission at Paris, France, October 8, 1898, by John Foreman. The friars demanded that Dr. Rizal be executed on the ground that he carried incendiary leaflets for the purpose of raising a rebellion ; but

the Governor-General refused to accede to their request, holding that the charge was unfounded. To quote Mr. Foreman's statement from Senate Document 62 :

“That displeased the priests very much. They had strife and questions between them and the governor-general, and the latter said, ‘I am going to see how you are working,’ and, all of a sudden, he had a raid made upon the residences of the Augustinian monks in a place north of Manila, and had the place suddenly seized and raided, and it is very well known that he found a press printing these same incendiary leaflets, and the priest who was employed in doing so was perfectly well known to every one in Malabon, to Americans and English, where there is a big sugar-refining establishment owned by Americans and English, the English resident in Manila and the Americans in Hong Kong, and known personally to them. The man disappeared, and was never seen again. I can hardly say where he went. These leaflets were seized, and from that moment the governor-general was a condemned man, and he left.”

Mr. Howard W. Bray states in his English translation of Dr. Ferdinand Blumentritt's "Biography of Dr. Rizal" regarding this point:

"It was an open secret at the time, that these pamphlets had been clandestinely introduced into his luggage by ecclesiastical intrigues. Rizal, on landing, naturally hastened to greet his family, leaving his luggage in the Custom House for subsequent examination. During his absence some officials, suborned by the Augustine Friars, introduced the pamphlets, and the Machiavelian plot succeeded. Rizal was banished to Dapitan, notwithstanding his indignantly protesting his innocence.

"Subsequent inquiries instituted by the then Governor-General, Despujols, revealed the fact that these very same pamphlets had been printed in a private printing-press owned by the Augustine Friars in the town of Malabon, near Manila, where not only were numerous numbers of them found, *but also the type still set!!*

"Such, however, is the omnipotent power of the friars in the Philippines, that Despujols had not the courage to revoke his

order of banishment, and from that time until the commencement of the rebellion poor Rizal remained a prisoner in the Spaniards' hands in the far-off colony of Dapitan, and the unpleasant affair was hushed up in the usual diplomatic way."

Mr. A. L. Mumper, of Greeley, Colorado, who served with an Idaho regiment in the Philippines, makes an interesting statement on this subject, based on personal observation. He says :

"It has been stated that Aguinaldo was party to a plan to massacre the inhabitants of Manila about the 13th of February. It is very probable that there is not more truth in this rumor than in a thousand similar rumors. Every soldier stationed in Manila knows that Manila is, and is far famed as being, a city of 'rumors'; knows that scarcely a week passed during the entire waiting that intervened between the fall of Manila, on the 13th of August, and the battle of February 5th, without similar rumors of plots of assassination and uprising among the Filipinos in the city.

Efforts to trace these rumors to their original source have often been made, and though they generally availed nothing some were traced to the friars as the originators. It is known that time and again the friars issued circulars for the purpose of prejudicing Americans and Spaniards against the Filipinos, as they understood the success of the Filipinos meant their downfall. Many of these circulars, all properly signed, were proved upon investigation to be spurious. And when this relation between the friars and Filipinos is understood, the motive will be easily understood.

“Another class at work was the discontented Spaniards, who, after the fall of the city of Manila, played into the hands of the Americans and were desirous of receiving their support and friendship as against the Filipinos. This class did everything they could to prejudice the Americans against the Filipinos; and between the friars and this class of Spaniards there were few things that could be said, that could hurt the Filipino cause, that were left unsaid. In the light of these facts we will be forced to conclude—until the most positive proof shall be brought forward—that this repeated plot of assassination and mur-

der is but another of those hundreds of former plots which never materialized."

Perhaps one of the saddest incidents in this history is the part that Admiral Dewey has played in it. The American people long for a worthy object on which to lavish their affection. They dearly love a hero, and they believed they had found one in Admiral Dewey. They did indeed find a naval hero; courage and skill united in him. The precise moment and occasion for the display of these qualities came, and the chance was not lost. How truly dramatic was the occasion! The crumbling castle walls of tyranny and greed fall to pieces as the bugle blast of this knight-errant blows. Could he have died in the moment of victory his name would have been immortal. What was it which set the American people wild with enthusiasm over his exploit, and prompted a

demonstration upon his return to his native land, spontaneous and irrepressible, such as has been offered none of our conquering soldiers or sailors? It could not have been the mere completeness of his victory, because Dewey slew a thousand Spaniards and lost not a man ; because he scuttled or burned all of the enemies' ships, preserving his own intact. The American mind is not so grossly material as to give the laurel wreath for an exploit which meant no more than this. Admiral Dewey was in the eyes of the people a great hero, not so much because he had conquered a force in every way inferior to his own, but because he was the living embodiment of American ideals of liberty and justice ; because he was freeing a subject people from the grinding tyranny of Spain. It was right overcoming wrong, not the demonstration only of a superior force vanquishing an in-

ferior one, which America discerned in that event.

Deprive the battle of Manila of this ethical element, subtle, imponderable as it is, and the hero is transferred at once into the vulgar conqueror. He is no better than hundreds of others who have fought and slain their foes. It was for this reason that discerning Americans felt grieved and humiliated upon finding that the man who honestly believed he was the representative of his country in the performance of a great deed, through whom America had given liberty and independence to the Philippines, should be content to see the peculiar lustre of his victory fade into the vulgar light of conquest. It seemed impossible that the nation's hero should be ready to accept, without protest, spurious honors at the hands of those who were responsible for the base and treacherous deed, which could only be had at the cost of

the true honors with which the nation sought to crown him for having effected a great deliverance for an outraged people. No man's fame as that of a hero can long endure, in this stage of the world's moral progress, in whose warlike achievement does not flow the life-blood of a great moral purpose. Imagine these words inscribed over the Dewey arch, "I never treated Aguinaldo as an ally, except to make use of him!"

A very striking confirmation is given to the view expressed in these pages as to the original opinion of Admiral Dewey concerning the true policy which the United States should have adopted in the Philippines. This is more remarkable in view of Admiral Dewey's apparent complete acceptance, during the interim, of the administration's policy of conquest. Major Carson, the reliable correspondent of the Philadelphia *Ledger*, reports in his

Washington despatch, April 16, 1900, "*As to the Philippines, he (Admiral Dewey) urges the withdrawal of the United States, and if we do anything we should aid the Filipinos to set up their own government.*" (Author's italics.)

The causes of the war between the United States and the Filipino *de facto* government are now perfectly obvious. These causes may be treated under two heads, 1st, the President's proclamation of December 21, 1898, declaring sovereignty over the islands; * 2d, our announcement to the Filipinos after the fall of Manila that their aspirations for self-government were to be ignored, and that their army was to have no share in the fruits of its victory. This announcement was virtually made by the steady pressing back of the Filipino lines, which began with the fall

* See Appendix, Note IV.

of Manila and culminated in open conflict at Santa Mesa, outside the limits of the city, on the night of February 4, 1899. Of the first cause it need only be said that President McKinley had neither legal nor moral right to issue such a proclamation. General Otis was so alarmed at the probable effect of this upon the Filipinos that he took the liberty of censoring it so as to cut out the words "sovereignty," "immediate extension of authority," etc., hoping that in this way he would deprive it of its principal power for mischief.*

Unfortunately, the proclamation got out in its unamended form. The mischief which General Otis feared was accomplished. President McKinley's act in issuing this proclamation was inexcusable. It involved not only a gross violation of constitutional re-

* See Appendix, Note V.

straints, coming as it did seven weeks before the Treaty of Paris was ratified, but it was equally reprehensible from the point of view of morals and common sense. In other words, when the treaty was constitutionally in *embryo*, General Otis was ordered to enforce by arms, if need be, its sovereignty provisions. No wonder he undertook to censor it! What were the actual conditions in Luzon at this time? The provisional government of Aguinaldo, while necessarily for the time dictatorial in its nature, was pledged to give way to a popular and elective form of government so soon as the troubled state of the country subsided into more peaceful and settled conditions. This government extended over the entire island of Luzon, with the exception of Manila, which was held by us, and some few ports in which the Spaniards were besieged. There was no state of anarchy existing

which would have justified us in seizing the islands for the preservation of peace and order. The report of Wilcox and Sargent, two naval officers who were sent by Admiral Dewey on a tour of inspection six hundred miles in extent through Luzon, in October and November, 1898, presents strong testimony of the peaceful conditions existing, and of the general content felt by the native people in the new government. Not a word appears in this report to indicate factional disputes or jealousies, or conflicts existing between the different native tribes or races, concerning which the Peace Commissioners have said so much.*

Rev. Peter MacQueen, pastor of a Congregational church in Somerville, Massachusetts, who spent some time in the Philippines, writes concerning the natives :

* See Appendix, Note VI.

“Two elements in the Filipino character are admitted by all, viz.,—bravery and brightness. The soldiers die and agonize without ever a contortion. The school-children can be taught anything. They learn to read and write as quickly as they learn to swim. There is far more general information among the Filipinos than we usually think. Nozaleda, Archbishop of Manila, told me that the common people in the Philippines are more intelligent than those of Spain. I tried a great many of the boys and of the working-men, and found that almost every one could write a good hand. . . . The young Malay mind readily acquires language, and already numbers of the children greet you in English on the street. On the boat to Nagasaki we had three boys from Negros coming with Chaplain McKennon to be educated in California. I took an 800-mile trip across Japan with the chaplain and his charges, and it was interesting to watch the boys studying each phase of Japanese life. They showed just as intelligent an appreciation of the country as American boys would. The Japanese thought our *protégés* were their own countrymen, and addressed them in the Japanese tongue. Ramon Lacson, son

of the president of Negros, aged fifteen and a B.A., took careful notes, and in six days had learned enough of Japanese words to act as an interpreter for us all."

Whether or not the Filipinos are capable of self-government may be a legitimate topic for debate, but it manifestly behooved the administration to show that the attempts of the natives to that end were a failure before it asked moral justification in its armed assault upon the existing Filipino *de facto* government.

This native government had held peaceful sway over the great island of Luzon for six months, and, indeed, until its military and civil officers were obliged to fight for their lives against the fierce onslaught of the soldiers of the Republic of Freedom! The burden of proof, showing that the Filipinos were incapable of governing themselves, rests upon the shoulders

of President McKinley, not upon those of his fellow-citizens who claim that the Filipinos were thus capable. The President in doing as he did was guilty of that very act of "criminal aggression" which he said was the proper term with which to stigmatize "forcible annexation." In view of testimony subsequently brought to light, the claims persistently put forth by the administration that the insurgent Filipinos began the war, and that our troops were only fighting on the defensive, become untenable. One is at a loss to understand how the administration and its apologists, aided by the press, can make such an assertion while facts showing that precisely the contrary was the case were within their own keeping, and therefore perfectly accessible to them.

It is not claimed that the Filipinos would have been capable of maintaining a government wholly without our

aid. They evidently looked for some sort of American protectorate, and would no doubt soon have fallen a prey to the cupidity of some foreign nation without such fostering care on our part. They would gladly have welcomed advice, suggestions, help from us in various ways. We could have exerted that moral influence over them, and have continued to receive in return that gratitude which our wise and friendly course towards Japan has through so many years produced. Our true policy was evidently similar to that adopted by Sir Andrew Clark, and which he, with so much wisdom and success, as a representative of Great Britain, carried out in the Straits Settlements. Such a policy provides an experienced friend and counsellor who points out to local rulers the best course for them to pursue in dealing with their own people. It disturbs local customs and conditions no more

than is necessary to avert conflicts with other tribes or races, and to prevent acts of cruelty or injustice. The outline of Sir Andrew Clark's policy, with its clear common sense and extraordinary success, was brought to President McKinley's attention through a letter remarkable for its practical wisdom, written by G. S. Clark, Esq., to Captain Mahan, U.S.N. After reading it, one is the more astonished that none of its excellent suggestions, based as they were on a rich experience, should have been adopted.

Mr. Clark's letter is as follows :

“As an earnest well-wisher of your country, I am following events very carefully now. . . . If you take a waiting station and leave the islands to stew in their own juice, there will be anarchy first and considerable annexation afterwards. . . . It is most natural that Americans should feel chary about accepting responsibilities over the destinies of eight million people of

somewhat mixed nationalities.—people who can fight.

“Yet I venture to think that in our empire there is a close parallel to the conditions in the Philippines and that we solved the problem, as it is certain in my mind that you can solve it. If you will look up the past of the native states of the Malay Peninsula, you will find conditions closely approximating to those of the Philippines. Fighting was incessant ; trade and development were at a stand-still. There is no corner of the world in which the development has been so swift and so perfectly successful. These native states are now prosperous and contented. The trade has increased by leaps and bounds. This is an advantage to us and to the rest of the world. Piracy, the joy of the Malay population, has disappeared. civilization is making rapid way.

“How has this been accomplished ? Not by troops. Not by force in any form. But wholly by a policy which I suggest is open to you. My namesake Sir Andrew Clarke inaugurated the policy which has led to the most astounding results. In the main it consisted by permitting only native rule and placing by the side of each native

ruler a strong and upright Englishman who guides and restrains. . . . There is a small Sikh police, whose superior officers only are Englishmen. That is the only force applied, and in late years there has been absolutely uninterrupted and yearly increasing prosperity. As this is a small corner of the earth, the facts are little known even here, and Americans cannot know them.

“Well here I am convinced lies your solution, and in some respects you have the advantage because the Philippines break up easily into geographical groups as the Malay states do not. Aguinaldo is a present difficulty, is he not? I know nothing of him, but he is evidently capable. Make him ruler of a portion of Luzon, with a fixed salary, and put by his side an honorable and strong man. . . . You can find in your navy and army the few men of the right stamp who are needed. Our trained officials are by no means the greatest of our successes. A soldier initiated the present system in the Malay Peninsula. Two sailors proved his most capable subordinates.

“Do turn this over in your mind, and if you can get the President to look into our administration of the Malay states and its extraordinary success. Here is a protec-

torate in its best sense, and it does not cost us a farthing."

President McKinley might have pursued such a policy in the Philippines, but he did not do so. We had a young, fresh, most hopeful growth ready to hand for such work had we desired to pursue that course. We found in Aguinaldo and his officers a body of young men, many of them well educated, most of them sincerely patriotic and enthusiastically devoted to their country. Had we treated these men with courtesy and consideration, approving their patriotic purpose, we could at once have firmly established a peaceful government, and have obtained full popular support for it. That this is not an extreme claim is evident from the fact that such a government, without our aid, lasted, even in the absence of such favoring conditions, for six months, from the

fall of Spanish power until our own claims of sovereignty were asserted. The favorable nature of the opportunity offered us was extraordinary, and is only equal in extent to the folly which first neglected it and then trampled upon it.

Had a man of capacity and tact, possessing the confidence of the people, been charged with the duty of effecting friendly and confidential relations with the representative leaders, and of adjusting their aspirations for liberty and self-government to the practical needs of the situation, the task, though not without its difficulties, could readily have been accomplished. Admiral Dewey was just such a man. He was on the spot; he had the confidence of the insurgents; he had a high opinion of the Filipinos. This opinion he expressed more than once in his despatches to Washington, and he evidently expected, from what he said

in them, that some such policy was to be adopted. He has expressed the opinion that the war might have been prevented by a competent and tactful officer in command. Brigadier-General Charles A. Whittier has openly testified to his belief that a little tact and courtesy in dealing with Aguinaldo would have averted the war. He is reported in the *New York Evening Post* of February 5, 1900, as saying:

“The final outbreak, in my opinion, was accidental and not as has been represented, a deliberate attempt at hostilities. The trouble could all have been avoided as I say, if we had been quietly working on Aguinaldo during these months of waiting. Very likely it might not have been easy, for Aguinaldo had a good many impracticable ideas at first; but with the reasonable temper which he always showed to me I can't think there could have been much trouble. As it was, we not only took no trouble to quiet and conciliate him, but we

passed him by. He told me I was the first American officer to meet him voluntarily, and his apparent pleasure in the fact showed what might have been done in the way of leading him where we wanted by giving him some outward importance in the eyes of the people."

Why this policy was not adopted, and why tact and friendliness were conspicuously absent in the treatment accorded the Filipinos by General Merritt and General Otis, is a question not difficult, in part at least, to answer. Sufficient tact and courtesy were shown towards Aguinaldo and his people until we had obtained what we sought by making use of them,—viz., the defeat of Spain. Until this end was attained the insurgent chief was known as Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Fami, or General Aguinaldo; but later he became Aguinaldo, and later still the "boy in the street." The administration permitted Aguinaldo to be

used for the accomplishment of a purpose most important to its designs. It had either given orders to this effect, which orders had not been published to the world, or it had at least granted discretion to Admiral Dewey to act as he did. But from the moment Manila fell, and the Spaniards were driven out of the islands, Aguinaldo became as fatal an embarrassment to the administration's ambitions as was Duncan to those of Macbeth. The least that could be done was to elbow him out of the way. It would never do to flatter his hopes that the original understanding effected with him was to be carried out. That meant the establishment of a native government. The administration evidently felt that a native government would obstruct the splendid vision of the "illimitable China trade" to which its eloquent apologist, Senator Beveridge, has referred. This elbowing process is

vividly described by an American volunteer who enlisted with the understanding that he was going to fight for freedom, the purpose originally announced,—not for the subjection of a people to our rule who had just escaped from the thralldom of Spain. He, with many others, went through a process of disillusion during the months of service in the Philippines. The extreme friendliness of the Filipinos at the time when our troops first landed at Manila was gradually turned into suspicion, irritation, and finally bitter hatred, by the treatment they received.

When Manila fell, the Filipinos were ordered not to enter the city. But some of their officers lodged in the better houses decently, as did ours, while some of their troops camped within the city limits. They were required by General Otis to march out, and to remain within prescribed

lines outside the city. This they did, though obedience to this order inflicted great humiliation upon them. Still, they took it with sufficient good nature to enable them to shout a friendly word as they passed some of our troops who watched them go by.

The Filipino soldiers asked as a favor, in marching out of Manila, permission to form on the Lunetta and to salute the spot where José Rizal and others of their martyred heroes had been executed by the Spaniards. We may imagine the emotions of these humble, dark-skinned soldiers as they stood where the blood of at least one true man and patriot had been cruelly shed. The heavy yoke of Spain was broken; a great deliverance had come through the new, strong race from beyond the sea; and yet the soldiers of that new power were already showing a spirit of arrogance, of contempt for the "little brown people," which

deeply wounded their pride and seemed to cast a dark shadow over the path leading into the future, which up to that time had seemed so bright with the sunshine of freedom.

Whatever were the faults and vices of the Filipinos, they were a temperate people, and however much they hated and had cause to hate the monastic orders, they were devout Roman Catholics ; their lives were generally moral, and they loathed drunkenness. But with the new-comers came active, energetic agents of American brewers. Saloons sprang up as in a night,—a poisonous, fungous growth. The walls of the city were disfigured by their signs. Their bad influence upon the troops was quickly evident. Drunken soldiers were not only repulsive and unusual objects for Malay eyes to rest upon, but were unpleasant and sometimes dangerous to encounter in the streets. Assaults of greater or less

gravity frequently occurred. On one occasion a Filipino fruit girl, a mere child, had her basket violently kicked by a drunken soldier and her wares sent flying in every direction. It was not an uncommon occurrence for a soldier under the influence of liquor to strike an inoffensive Filipino civilian on the head with a beer-bottle. It was a common thing for the rougher characters among the soldiers to "Kangaroo" a Filipino fruit-vender, —to jostle him until his attention was attracted, and then to take his fruit without paying for it. The testimony of Rev. Peter MacQueen shows that assaults on Filipinos, not on Spaniards, were scandalously frequent. He mentions a number quite unprovoked which he personally witnessed. Had the influence of their officers generally been against such outrages, they could not have happened so frequently. It was contempt that filtered from above

to the ranks towards the "niggers," as the Filipinos came too frequently to be called, that made such outrages of frequent occurrence. The Filipino officers, when coming into Manila, were not allowed to wear their side-arms,—a privilege accorded to Spanish officers,—nor the Filipino private soldiers to retain their knives. It was understood that the Filipino soldiers could get their knives back again upon returning to their camps, but it was usually the case that by that time the knife had become a "souvenir," and the soldier who had possession of it could not be found, or at least could not be identified.* These things burned deeply into the hearts of the people, but the Peace Commission do not seem to have heard of them, for they do not mention them in their report.

* Statement of Abram L. Mumper, Greeley, Colorado.

What judicial mind could afford to neglect such incidents in reaching a just estimate of the situation? Or what people, whether barbarous or highly civilized, could have avoided the conflict which ultimately came between the Filipinos and our troops? And yet for that conflict, which finally broke out on the night of February 4, 1899, the Filipinos cannot be justly blamed, as the American people have very generally supposed.

The immediate cause of the breaking out of the conflict is to be found in General Otis's order requiring the Nebraska regiment to advance its lines within territory that the Filipinos could fairly consider theirs. The protocol gave us the right to occupy the bay, harbor, and city of Manila,—nothing beyond,—and the protocol remained in force until the Peace Treaty was passed by the Senate, signed by the President, and its ratifi-

cation had been exchanged by the Spanish Government, which occurred April 11. The Senate passed the treaty February 6, and the President signed it February 10. The war broke out February 4. General Otis clearly was not justified in advancing his military lines beyond the actual limits of Manila until after the treaty was ratified and the exchange of that ratification with Spain had taken place. To do so showed a complete disregard for the rights of the Filipinos, and seems to establish the fact that we were quite willing, if not anxious, to provoke a conflict with them.

We learn from General Otis's report that he wished General Miller's forces to attack Iloilo on the 7th of February for certain "overmastering political reasons." He says (page 103):

"The territory was no longer Spain's, but we still hesitated to take decisive action,

for fear of provoking the insurgents, or really giving them the excuse to attack us which they desired. Now this last obstacle had been removed by their determined onslaughts on Manila, *and it was very important, for overmastering political reasons, to take possession of these southern ports, through force or otherwise, as circumstances might demand. . . . We . . . concluded that exigencies compelled us to clear up the field* which we were confronting at Iloilo." [Author's italics.]

These "overmastering political reasons" doubtless existed previously, and they may have prompted throwing the Nebraska troops within Filipino boundaries, which, in view of the irritation and tension already existing, would be almost certain to provoke a conflict. In the absence of any explicit information upon the nature of these "political reasons," we can only surmise that they are to be found in the President's wish to get the Peace Treaty ratified. If so, a ruthless

massacre of Filipinos was the means deliberately chosen for effecting political ends in Washington. General Otis was well aware of how positively the Filipinos objected to this advance of the American lines, for it had been made the subject of correspondence between Aguinaldo and himself.

In reference to the question whether Santa Mesa is located within or beyond the limits of Manila, the following extracts from correspondence between Aguinaldo and General Otis are interesting. A valuable editorial appeared in the *Springfield Republican* of January 31, 1900, on this subject. The following is a quotation from it :

“When General Otis succeeded General Merritt as commander of the United States forces in the Philippines in August, 1898, a correspondence between General Merritt and Aguinaldo, concerning the proper location of the American military lines around Manila, was well advanced, but still pend-

ing; and the final negotiations thereupon devolved upon General Otis. After parleying, the Filipinos retired beyond the lines insisted upon by General Otis, with an exception or two, including Pandacan. General Otis, desiring to hold Pandacan because of its obvious military value, threatened on October 14, 1898, to use military force to drive the Filipino army out of the town, writing an ultimatum to Aguinaldo as follows:

“‘I must request such withdrawal on or before the 20th instant, else I shall be forced into some action looking to that end.’

“Aguinaldo on October 22 thus replied to General Otis:

“‘GENERAL,—In view of your favor of the 14th instant, I consulted the opinions of my generals and advisory council, and I have appointed Dr. Pardo de Tavera, in order that he might place before you the wishes of all, as he did on the 18th. Said commissioners, upon giving me an account of your wishes, told me that you had consented to postpone the ultimatum for the withdrawal of our troops until the 25th, and the retention by our forces of the block-house situated on the line shown on the blue map, which you sent me with said

letter, but had not acceded to the desires of the Philippine people that my forces continue to occupy Pandacan. Relative to the latter point, I take the liberty of telling you that your predecessor, General Merritt, understood that the American forces only ought to occupy, according to the terms of the capitulation of Manila, the city and its environs,—*i.e.*, Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, Malate, and Paco, or San Fernando de Dilao, and thus he clearly puts it in his letter of August 20 last. The town of Pandacan has always been considered outside of the old municipal limits of Manila, which the general himself mentions in said letter, and I hope your high sense of judgment will see it thus. Nevertheless, I understand that your forces are already occupying Uli-Uli, Nactahan, and Santa Mesa districts, which, although belonging to the jurisdiction of Pandacan, they can continue to do, in order to prevent the continual encounters with mine which cause disagreeable incidents.'

"On the 25th, in response to General Otis's ultimatum, which was a threat of war, the Filipino troops were withdrawn from Pandacan. That they withdrew, how-

ever, with a feeling of wrath and outraged justice cannot be doubted, for General Otis himself, two days after their withdrawal, in a letter to Aguinaldo, admitted that Aguinaldo's statements as to Pandacan were well founded. Otis wrote him (pages 20, 21) :

“ ‘I have referred to General Merritt's letter of August 20, which you mention, and find that it is as you state. . . . I have been led to believe that it (Pandacan) has, of late, been considered out of the city's suburbs, although we have been unable to find any Spanish decree which fixes its status with definiteness.’

“Here is Otis admitting to Aguinaldo that General Merritt has considered Pandacan as beyond the limits of the city of Manila, or its suburbs, or its defences. And here he is, also, admitting that he could find no Spanish authority for considering the town as one of the city suburbs. With Merritt agreeing with Aguinaldo and Otis unable to sustain his course by any Spanish authority, what is the reasonable conclusion regarding Pandacan?

“It was in that region, which the Filipinos never could have regarded as justly or legally held by the United States, that a

stray insurgent, heedless of the challenge of a Nebraska sentry, was shot on February 4, 1899. And thus the war began. In this same report by General Otis there is fresh evidence, to be referred to later on, that no assault on the American lines was premeditated by the Filipinos that fateful night, but in this article the *Republican* confines its analysis of the report to this contention alone: That the troops commanded by General Otis had no right, under the peace protocol, to be in occupation of the region where the clash between the two armies finally came. The unpremeditated encounter came on territory which Otis had seized by force, without lawful warrant, and which Merritt himself had conceded was not within American jurisdiction. These are facts to remember, for they have a bearing upon the historical phases of the imperialistic controversy."

General C. McC. Reeve, promoted from colonel of the Minnesota regiment for bravery, and who was provost-marshal of Manila at the time of the outbreak in February, 1899, said in an

interview in Minneapolis about April 24, 1899:

"I can tell you one piece of news that is not generally known in the United States. On Sunday, February 5, the day after the fighting began, General Torres, of the insurgents, came through our lines under a flag of truce, and had a personal interview with General Otis, in which, speaking for Aguinaldo, he declared that the fighting had been begun accidentally and was not authorized by Aguinaldo; that Aguinaldo wished to have it stopped, and that to bring about a conclusion of hostilities he proposed the establishment of a neutral zone between the two armies of any width that would be agreeable to General Otis, so that during the peace negotiations there might be no further danger of conflicts between the two armies. To these representations of General Torres General Otis sternly replied that the fighting having once begun must go on to the grim end. And it has been going on ever since."

General Otis, in response to an inquiry, made through a resolution of

the United States Senate, cabled May 1, 1900, a reply in explanation of his alleged refusal of Aguinaldo's overtures for peace made immediately after the outbreak of hostilities on February 4, 1899. The despatch from Adjutant-General Corbin making the inquiry and General Otis's reply answering it are given herewith. In the estimation of the author, General Otis's reply is unsatisfactory, and it is contradictory of a former important despatch sent by him immediately after the event in dispute occurred. For his present despatch to be strictly true and therefore to have weight, his earlier one must have been essentially untrue and, therefore, valueless. In his despatch of February 8, 1899, General Otis reported, without qualification, that Aguinaldo "now applies for cessation of hostilities and conference. Have declined to answer." Herein General Otis himself corroborated the essential

part of General C. McC. Reeve's statement showing that Aguinaldo's overtures for peace immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities had been rejected. That is the essential point, which, being established, places so terrible a load of responsibility on the shoulders of General Otis and the administration. But in his despatch of May 1, 1900, General Otis says of his earlier one that it was "hasty" and "misleading." Does he wish us to infer from this that its important statement of fact, concerning Aguinaldo's application for a cessation of hostilities and his refusal to grant it, is false? If he does not wish us to draw this inference, what are we to infer? The least that we can do is to discredit him as a witness. He certainly discredits himself. We are the more led to this conclusion when we recall the fact that General Otis is the author of despatches running through the period of at least a

year assuring the public that the Philippine insurrection was on the eve of collapse, or actually over, when in reality it has continued up to this moment (August, 1900).

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 30, 1900.

To Otis, Manila :

Cable whether General Torres came to you under flag of truce, February 5, 1899, and stated Aguinaldo declared fighting had begun accidentally and not authorized by him ; that Aguinaldo wished it stopped, and to end hostilities proposed establishment of neutral zone between the two armies of width agreeable to you, so during peace negotiations there might be no further danger of conflict. Whether you replied fighting having begun, must go on to grim end.

CORBIN.

The following is General Otis's reply :

MANILA, MAY 1, 1900.

Adjutant-General War, Washington :

Judge Torres, citizen resident of Manila, who had served as member insurgent com-

mission, reported evening February 5, asking if something could not be done to stop the fighting and establishment of neutral zone. I replied Aguinaldo had commenced the fighting and must apply for cessation. I had nothing to request from insurgent government. He asked permission to send Colonel Arguellez to Malolos, and Arguellez was passed through lines near Caloocan next morning. He went direct to Malolos, told General Aguinaldo and Mabini that General Otis would permit suspension of hostilities upon their request. They replied declaration of war had been made, a copy of which they furnished him. They said they had no objection to suspension of hostilities, but beyond this general remark made no response, but directed him to return with that message. Arguellez reported that he conveyed my statement; that they had commenced the war, and it must go on, since they had chosen that course of action, but did not attempt to induce them to make any proposition, as he feared accusation of cowardice. The insurgent chief authorities made no proposition and did not intend to make any, nor did they attempt to do so until driven out of Malolos. My hasty despatch of about that

date misleading. Look in writing statement of Arguellez several days ago in order to fully understand temper of insurgents at early period of war.

Lieutenant Martin E. Tew, of the Minnesota regiment of volunteers, who was since a member of General Otis's staff, published a letter in the *Minneapolis Times*, in which he quotes Lieutenant-Colonel Zialcita, major of cavalry in the Filipino army, as follows :

“The Filipinos never had the slightest intention of attacking the Americans, because we had been assured by them that they were our friends and allies. As a proof of the statement that it was not a premeditated attack, I cite the facts that on the same evening many of Aguinaldo's adjutants and officers were in Manila. Some had returned to Malolos on the last evening train, and others, as you know, remained in the city and were held by you as prisoners of war.”

President McKinley could not have read General C. McC. Reeve's state-

ment, nor General Otis's report touching this point. General Otis admits that he "does not think the insurgents intended to attack at this time," for he says in his message: "The aggressions of the Filipinos continually increased, until finally, *just before the time set by the Senate of the United States for a vote upon the treaty,*"—(Author's italics.) (The reader should here note that General Otis reported *that there were "overmastering political reasons"* why we should attack Iloilo at precisely this time)—"*an attack evidently prepared in advance was made all along the American lines,*" etc.

Aguinaldo had protested against the forward movement, arguing that it was unwarranted. He pointed out the fact that Santa Mesa, where the Nebraska regiment was stationed, lay beyond the limits prescribed by the protocol. General Otis at first disputed this claim, but finally virtually admitted its jus-

tice. Why, then, did he not withdraw his troops, supposing that he did not desire to begin war? We find no satisfactory answer to this question. The conclusion is irresistible that the administration had determined to obtain full possession of the islands in advance of the ratification of the treaty, and even at the cost of war provoked by it. To advance our lines and then hold them at a point which Aguinaldo showed we had no right to occupy was a clear indication that it was the President's policy to provoke a conflict. Otherwise, why were constitutional rights and moral rights not considered in dealing with the Filipino leaders whom we had called into the islands to aid us in driving out the Spaniards? The official acts of the President, while expressed in the smoothest and most benevolent phraseology, in their substance and intent meant war; while in the neglect of the Filipino leaders by

our military leaders, and in the contempt shown the Filipino people by our troops, as well as in the constant pressing back of the Filipino lines, are to be found all the necessary additional causes which conspired to bring war.

The fight which opened the war, and which occurred on the night of February 4, came about in this way: It was claimed by the Filipinos that our line which Grayson patrolled at Santa Mesa extended into their territory. On the morning of February 4, when Private Grayson, of the Nebraska regiment, went on duty, a Filipino officer had words with him about the position of our line, objecting to it, and threatening that if the Americans did not move back many of them might be killed. The Filipino officer spoke in Spanish, and Grayson thought he had been drinking. It was a wrangle.

Later in the day Colonel Stotsen-

burg, of the Nebraska regiment, who was killed in battle later in the war, passed by. On being appealed to concerning the line, he advised its extension still farther in the direction of the Filipino position. This was done notwithstanding the fact that those Filipinos who saw our advance waved their arms and guns in protest. All this occurred near Block-House No. 7. The Nebraska regiment, posted on the high ground at Santa Mesa, was about one mile in advance of the lines held by the rest of our troops. And it now appears this point was beyond the limits assigned the United States under the terms of the protocol, which only gave us the right to occupy the bay, harbor, and city of Manila. At eight o'clock in the evening Grayson was again on guard, when near him the same Filipino officer, who had disputed with him in the morning, endeavored to cross the American lines. Grayson

stated to A. L. Mumper* that he challenged the Filipino twice, calling, "Halt! Halt!" The man answered, "Alto, alto," presumably in contempt. Grayson then fired, killing him. He then retired to Block-House No. 7, and reported to the sergeant on duty there what he had done. He was sent back to the line with a squad

* Mr. Abram L. Mumper was a member of Company H, First Idaho Regiment. He took part in the assault on Manila, August 13, 1898; also in the battle of Manila, February 4 and 5, 1899. In this latter action he served under General King, who led the charge upon the insurgent stronghold. He was also in the fight at Caloocan, February 9, upon this occasion serving with the Twentieth Kansas. Later he took part in the first battle before Malabon, February 10, and in several skirmishes on the south line between San Pedro Macati and Passay. The author has received the strongest testimonials as to Mr. Mumper's high character, reliability, and accuracy as a witness.

of men. Two or three more Filipinos were found crossing the line. Our soldiers fired upon them, either killing or wounding some. This occurred, according to Grayson's statement, about fifteen minutes after the first shot had been fired. This encounter was followed by general firing from the Filipino lines. But it is evident that no attack had been anticipated by them, and that their assault on us was naturally provoked by the shooting of their men. Private Grayson was, of course, simply acting under orders. Grayson also told Abram L. Mumper on board the transport "Hancock," as the former's regiment was about to sail for the United States, that it was "the damned bull-headedness" of the officers in invading insurgent territory that was responsible for the firing of his shot. The circumstances seem to favor the belief that our authorities intended to provoke a conflict if they found it

impossible otherwise to disembarass themselves of the native *de facto* government. It was, no doubt, supposed that the struggle would be of very short duration. By making the war "hell" for the insurgents,—that was the current term,—it was expected that they would submit to American rule in the course of a few weeks, when the process of "benevolent assimilation" would begin.* There was a

* The version which is here given of the outbreak of the war is that which was given the author by Abram L. Mumper, of Greeley, Colorado, an honorably discharged volunteer, who served in the Philippines. The author has fully satisfied himself of Mr. Mumper's good character and reliability of statement. Readers who wish to assure themselves further on this point can do so by addressing Abram L. Mumper, Greeley, Colorado. Mr. Mumper can give the most satisfactory reference from prominent citizens in his locality as to his standing and character. During some two

general feeling of contempt for the natives, expressed in the term "niggers," which was used by our officers, in some instances at least, as well as by the privates. It was doubtless this feeling of contempt, so natural to the Anglo-Saxon in his relations with a dark-skinned and weaker race, and the hope that fighting might be soon ended by making it fierce for the time, which led to so much looting and to some atrocities that in the beginning of the war were indulged in by our troops. Looting to any great extent would not have occurred if the officers had set their faces against it. Our troops did

months of the past winter the author was in almost daily contact with Mr. Mumper. He takes this occasion to express gratitude for the large amount of valuable information received from him, and to record his conviction of Mr. Mumper's entire sincerity, deep, unselfish patriotism, and practical common sense.

not loot from the Spaniards, although they had the chance to do so. They fully respected private property in Manila. Why, then, did they not show equal restraint in those fights which took place immediately after the 4th of February?

Mr. John F. Bass, the Philippine correspondent of *Harper's Weekly*, refers to this matter in a letter published during the summer of 1899. He says :

“The plan for crushing the insurrection has varied in policy from time to time. Pasig, the second largest town in Luzon, was looted and burned; the villages for miles along the southern shore of Laguna de Bay were laid waste. The barbarous native should be taught how terrible war waged by American soldiers was. Then came a period when sometimes a town was burned and sometimes it was not, no plan being apparently followed. *The insurgents are a good deal like children, and they imitated us; instead of leaving their towns for us to*

burn, they burned them themselves. [Author's italics.]

* * * * *

The town of Guiguinto I saw set on fire by our men and burn up, no steps being taken to punish the offenders. The height of the ridiculous was reached when Malolos, the next town, five miles up the railroad, was captured. Here the utmost care was taken by our officers to protect property; a brigadier-general rode into town and exclaimed dramatically that the honor of the United States required that our conduct should contrast with that of the insurgents. The latter burned and pillaged, while we protected property and the rights of the people."

* * * * *

"There has been a great hue and cry raised because the insurgents mutilated two of our dead by cutting off their ears, and yet one or two of our scouts made a practice of cutting off the ears of the insurgents they killed and preserving them as trophies. Needless to say, this custom, when discovered, was stopped by the officers. Outrages on either side I believe to be isolated cases, with the honors fairly divided. There are bad men in every army."

Mr. Robert M. Collins, the Philippine correspondent of the Associated Press, wrote Mr. Melville E. Stone, General Manager, under date of July 30, 1899, describing the circumstances which led to the protest of the newspaper representatives against the censoring of news by General Otis. Extracts from this letter are given as follows :

“But when General Otis came down in the frank admission that it was not intended so much to prevent the newspapers from giving information and assistance to the enemy (the legitimate function, and according to our view, the only legitimate one of a censorship), but to keep the knowledge of conditions here from the public at home, and when the censor had repeatedly told us, in ruling out plain statements of undisputed facts, ‘My instructions are to let nothing go that can hurt the administration,’ we concluded that protest was justifiable.

* * * * *

“Three hours of exceedingly plain talk followed. The general did not contradict

our statements that the purpose of the censorship was to keep the facts from the public, but said that what we wanted was to have the people stirred up and to make sensations for the papers. We told him that there had never been any subject furnishing more good material for sensations than this war, and that he should be exceedingly grateful to the papers handling it so temperately.

“In that connection we reminded him that the stories of looting in soldiers' letters home had been little, if any, exaggerated. Davis and Bass told him that they had personally seen our soldiers bayoneting the wounded ; and I reminded him that the cutting off of the ears of two American soldiers at Dasmarinas had been merely retaliation for similar mutilations of dead Filipinos by the Americans. (No one could possibly tell stronger stories of the looting and black-mailing of our soldiers than Otis has told, although he charges it all to the volunteers.)

“We told him that we had refrained from sending these things and others of similar nature because we did not wish to make sensations. We told him that the censorship was purely for the purpose of giving the impression at home that everything

was lovely here, otherwise he would suppress the local papers which print all sorts of clippings from American papers, denouncing the administration, and which kept the enemy posted on the position of every company in our army, and even give advance notice of intended movements.

* * * * *

"Recently I filed what I thought a most inoffensive statement that the business men who had appeared before the Commission had advocated the retention of the existing silver system of currency. The censor said, 'I ought not to let that go. That would be a lift for Bryan. My instructions are to shut off everything that could hurt McKinley's administration. That is free silver.' I explained that the silver system here was not 16 to 1, and with seeming reluctance he O.K.'d the item."

Readers who desire to make critical examination of the alleged shooting of Filipino prisoners at the battle of Caloocan are referred to an interesting statement on this subject which appears in a letter to the Springfield

Republican, December 12, 1899, from Edmund Boltwood, late captain Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U.S.V. This was written from Ottawa, Kansas, and bears date December 6, 1899.

A. L. Mumper testifies on this point as follows :

“It kept leaking down from sources above that the Filipinos were ‘niggers,’ no better than Indians, and were to be treated as such. Whether this policy came from Washington or was born in the minds of the ambitious officers who had not yet gained enough glory, I cannot say. But I can say that on more than one battle-field they were treated like Indians. At Caloocan I saw natives shot down that could have been taken prisoners, and the whole country around Manila set ablaze with apparently no other object than to teach the natives submission by showing them that with the Americans war was hell.”

The original correspondent of the New York *Evening Post*, Mr. H. L. Wells (a volunteer), while he denies

that the killing of prisoners occurred, treats at great length the question of looting and the appropriation of private property. This was indulged in to a shameful extent not only by the rank and file, but by many volunteer officers. Mr. Wells says in a letter to the *Evening Post*, published July 20, 1899 :

“As I said before, every house was entered, and if anything had been left by the former occupants it was thoroughly overhauled. Clothing was snatched out of bureaus and scattered over the floor in search of valuables. Boxes were broken open. Suspicious mounds in back yards were dug into. Cisterns were probed and bamboo thickets were inspected. Often caches of clothing, crockery, books, etc., were discovered, and their contents scattered in the search for valuables, very few of which were found. Probably the two richest places, because the most hastily abandoned, were the cities of Pasig and Malabon. I was in Pasig the day after its capture, and at that time there was not a

house that had not been ransacked. It was current rumor that several sums of money had been found, one soldier having discovered about \$1500. I was told by a saloon-keeper in Manila a few days later that several soldiers had exhibited considerable rolls of Filipino paper money. However, such things must be chiefly conjecture, since a soldier finding money would keep very quiet about it for his own protection. Only a few cases of such finds have come under my personal observation, and in those the amounts were small. There were a number of houses in Pasig belonging to wealthy persons, and it may well be that articles worth carrying off were found. I know that the floors were covered with clothing, much of it expensive goods, that had been thrown from wardrobes. In one house I waded knee-deep in elegant gowns of silk, satin, and piña cloth. The condition of affairs in Malabon was much the same, and in every town entered by our troops until the past month, when the appointment of a provost-marshal and guard has been the first act of the commanding general. I have seen fine libraries scattered about and trampled under foot, many valuable books being

carried away. I have seen books nearly two centuries old in the possession of soldiers.

“There has been no personal violence at any time that I have seen or heard of. Only vacant houses have been searched. Whenever the occupants have remained instead of fleeing, they have been unmolested in either person or property. Actually there has been but little property taken. More has been damaged or destroyed than carried away. The bump of destruction seems to be abnormally developed in the average soldier. He seems to delight in breaking furniture and smashing looking-glasses and crockery. Even pianos are not sacred from his violence. Why this is so I cannot say. I do not understand it to be a condition of mind peculiar to the soldier in the Philippines or to this generation. If I remember aright, the same tendencies existed during our civil war. I only tell it as a fact that the average soldier who picks up a fine piece of crockery to look at throws it down again, instead of placing it down gently; sticks his heel through the panels of sideboards, and carves the legs of pianos with his bolo. At the same time the average

officer possesses himself of the best horse and caromato he can find, and the average general blossoms out with a fine span and elegant carriage, for which he is unable to present a bill of sale.

“The richest trophy-hunting was in Manila after its capture in August last. Private property was not taken, but there was plenty of public property to supply souvenirs galore, among other things a splendid collection of ancient and modern arms, which melted away under the covetous gaze of those high enough in authority to reach it. I call to mind the case of a certain army chaplain who undertook to possess himself of a small cannon of ancient make to present to the university of his State, and was severely criticised by officers of much higher rank, who at the time held in their possession and for their own use articles of much greater intrinsic value. And this reminds me of a significant remark made by an officer who had accumulated a few such trophies as a Mauser, kris, bolo, sword, etc. A civilian who was looking at his collection asked him if he was not afraid of a court-martial. He replied no, because there was no officer competent to order a court-martial, from the governor-

general down, who would be willing to trade collections with him. But that was long ago, and now the orders are so strict that the poor soldier who seeks curios, or even endeavors to add chicken to his bill-of-fare, does so with the guard-house and military prison at Bilibid staring him in the face."

That some of the army officers not only winked at this practice, but encouraged it, is evident from a statement made in the book written by Karl Irving Faust and Rev. Peter MacQueen, "Campaigning in the Philippines," to this effect (page 203):

"The Idahos, under Major Figgins, camped in the church at Lumban. The orders were very strict about looting. But the old major said he thought he could construe them so as to let his men catch chickens and take mats from the houses to cover them from the dew. One brawny miner was hauling away a piece of carpet, and was thus found by General Lawton. Lawton took him up to Major Figgins. 'What

is the charge, General?' said Figgins. 'I found this man looting,' answered the General. 'All right, General,' said Figgins; 'leave him to me; I'll deal with him.' When Lawton went away the major turned to his man, who was an Irishman, 'You big galoot; why did you let the General catch you? Now off with you, and get your carpet, and don't let me see you get caught again.' "

The testimony of other volunteers is to the same effect. Mahogany or camphor chests are common in many Filipino houses. They are used by the people for preserving clothing from the ravages of destructive insects. After the capture of a village, and when the inhabitants had fled, soldiers would break open the lids of these chests with the butts of their guns, rifle the contents, take what they fancied, and then leave the rest scattered about in wanton confusion, until the flames, afterwards applied to the

houses, destroyed all trace of what had occurred.

It is evident that this looting was not necessary, and therefore not excusable, while the burning of the villages was a wanton destruction of property. Such acts of license could have been restrained by proper discipline. If it was successfully avoided in dealing with the Spanish enemy, what was to prevent equal success in dealing with the Filipinos?

While this question is treated rather as an incident and apart from the main issue, it has its relative value in a consideration of the whole subject. It shows the bad spirit which existed. Such lawless and disgraceful acts are condoned by some with the excuse, "Such things always occur in war." If so, let them be patiently chronicled, that an advancing civilization, in abhorrence of them, may render war more difficult and less frequent.

It has now been made clear that the war was virtually forced upon the Filipinos by the general policy which we pursued in the islands and by our incidental actions. To summarize, it has been shown : First, that a proclamation of sovereignty was issued at a time when it was not within the President's constitutional power to take this grave step, and when a *de facto* native government was preserving peace and fulfilling its functions in all territory over which its authority extended ; second, that the first shot in the conflict was fired by us in territory outside Manila, and hence beyond the limits of our jurisdiction. But the most important fact in this history, and one deserving the greatest emphasis, is that when the Filipinos wished to stop fighting,—and this they certainly did not intend at that time to begin,—their request was refused by the American general in command at Manila.

On February 5 Aguinaldo sent General Torres through the lines with a flag of truce to make an offer which bore on the face of it a sincere desire to restore peace. He declared that the fighting had begun without his intention, and this was sufficiently evident, since General Otis admits as much on pages 20, 21 of his report. Aguinaldo offered to place a neutral zone between the territories occupied by the two armies, so that friction incident to closer contact might be avoided. But this reasonable proposition General Otis refused to consider, declaring that the war, having begun, must go on to the grim end. What warrant was there for assuming so extreme and arbitrary a position? The war was no "war" in any just sense of that term. There was only a murderous conflict existing, which had no declared object, and which should at once have been stopped, since it was

an unmeaning and unnecessary sacrifice of human life. This occurrence took place February 5, 1899. Congress had declared no war. The Peace Treaty was not ratified. As already stated, it was adopted by the Senate February 5, the following day, and was signed by the President, February 10, but was not formally concluded until the Spanish Government had exchanged the ratification with us which took place April 11. Therefore General Otis, when he said "the war must go on," whether he spoke only on his own authority or under orders from Washington, decreed a brutal slaughter, unjustified by the Constitution of the United States and warranted by no practical exigency of the situation. There was no moral reason, or one that could be stated, for continuing the fighting. What was the real reason? We can only conjecture, but this much we can do. To continue

fighting may have been determined upon in order that the Peace Treaty might be forced through the Senate by the popular belief existing at home that violence and bloodshed were carried on in the Philippines, and that there existed no responsible native government to restore order. This conjecture, discreditable as it must be to the administration, is much strengthened by a statement which appears in General Otis's report. He states that on February 7, 1899, he was anxious to secure permission for General Miller to make an armed attack on Iloilo, a town lying on the seacoast in the island of Cebu, because there were "overmastering *political* reasons" which made this desirable. It would be interesting to know definitely just what those political reasons were. They could not certainly have been political reasons, from the Filipino point of view, existing in the Philippines.

The politics of these islands called, above all things, for peace, not war; for an amicable adjustment of misunderstandings between ourselves and the natives after their terrible struggle with Spanish tyranny. We are led to infer that it was a political exigency in the United States of which General Otis had probably been informed by cable despatch from Washington. Politics of some sort, we are warranted in declaring, on General Otis's authority, required that a town resting peacefully in the hands of the insurgent government should be attacked. Such action on our part, of course, involved the destruction of human life and property. Could anything be more cynically merciless than this proposition, which sought to promote party welfare or personal ambition, at the expense of the lives and goods of the Filipinos, and without even that technical excuse which is secured from a legally de-

clared war? General Otis still had not that excuse, for he states that it was on February 7 when he desired to make the assault, and it will be remembered the treaty was not signed by the President until the 10th.

The final touch of irony is given to this sad history by a despatch of General Miller, in which he expresses a strong wish to attack Iloilo because the insurgent authorities are meanwhile collecting customs and conducting the post-office. The General reasons that if they are allowed to continue such functions they will get the notion that they are capable of managing things themselves.* Such reasoning, advanced by the servants of a despotic government, of Russia or Turkey, would occasion no surprise; but from the lips of a citizen

* Report of General E. S. Otis, 1899, page 62.

soldier of the American democracy it is astonishing.

In concluding the story of this attempted conquest of the Philippines, it remains only to note that General Otis also tells us in his report that the conflict was carried on by a "vigorous offensive" movement on our part, and was wholly "defensive" on the part of the insurgents. In a word, judging from the facts already cited, whether the matter be considered morally or technically, our authorities forced the war which has now been waged for more than a year upon the Filipino *de facto* government, and upon the Christian population of the islands. Whatever responsibility is involved in that act, and in its far-reaching and awful consequences, must rest mainly upon the President. It is, of course, a responsibility shared by his immediate advisers, and by that very large number of his political and other

adherents who have applauded and sustained what he has done. There can be little doubt that very many such persons have taken their stand on this question in ignorance of the facts, and under the guidance of that large and influential body of the press of the country which has greatly hidden or misrepresented the truth.

Nor can we justly hesitate to hold Mr. McKinley himself responsible for those seriously erroneous or misleading statements which have appeared in his numerous public speeches on the Philippine question. Perhaps one of the most serious of these was the assertion that he had always believed, and still believes, that the great mass of the Filipino people had no other aspiration than for our sovereignty. No doubt is to be cast upon the assertion that such is Mr. McKinley's sincere belief, but one is at a loss to know on what basis of reliable evidence it rests.

The despatches of Dewey, Anderson, Pratt, Wildman, and Williams all spoke a distinctly contrary opinion; while the letters of the very best correspondents, even including representatives of imperialist or expansion papers, testified strongly to the contrary view. John Bass, representing *Harper's Weekly* and the New York *Herald*, Rev. Peter MacQueen, of Somerville, Massachusetts, Mr. Phelps Whitmarsh, of the *Outlook*, Mr. A. G. Robinson, of the New York *Evening Post*, Rev. Clay McCauley, representing the Boston *Transcript*, may be included in the list.

Rev. Peter MacQueen says in a letter which appeared in *The Congregationalist*, of Boston :

“The Filipinos are exceptionally brave men. They suffer pain and loss like martyrs. Whether they are right or wrong in opposing America depends on the view you take. From the point of view of the ma-

terial development of their islands, they are woefully wrong. From the point of view that nobody has any sovereignty to sell except those who own the land, they are absolutely right.

“In defence of the principles for which Bruce and Winkelreid and Leonidas fought, these people now redden the swamps of Luzon with their blood. As far as the theory goes, the argument leans their way. ‘Who are these Americans,’ Aguinaldo is reported to have asked, ‘who are always prating about freedom, who are crowding into our islands, and standing, as the Spaniards did, between us and our liberty?’ This is a hard question; who can answer it?

“The Filipinos have not a high character for honesty—they have mingled too much with Europeans for that. Some can be trusted, but most, I fear, cannot. . . .

“There is, however, some excuse for the feeling among the Filipinos that it is no sin to rob an American. In the first place, the Americans have kept the old Spanish taxes in all their wanton rigor. The Filipinos of Manila pay higher taxes now than they did in the worst days of Weyler. We have revived many obsolete taxes and are

collecting them with terrific vigor. Then, in our army there have been scoundrels who have gone into private houses dressed in soldiers' uniform and have demanded from the poor wretches a tax which they spent in the neighboring saloon. Thus, these irresponsible rascals would go into a house that had a piano and say that they had come to collect a tax of \$5 upon it. The people were terrorized by men who had uniforms and guns, and so paid these unheard-of taxes.

"Late in July General Otis issued a proclamation in English, Spanish, and Tagalog, calling upon people not to pay taxes except at the authorized offices. Some of our soldiers kick and cuff and bully the natives in the streets; and many a scowl and muttered curse shows that the Malay is biding his time. These people do not forget indignities. They are as sensitive as a woman, as proud as a Spaniard, as brave as a lion. We have not, so far as I can see, succeeded in making one of them either fear or love us."

John Bass, the experienced correspondent of the New York *Herald*

and of *Harper's Weekly*, wrote of the situation in August, 1899, as follows :

"The whole population of the islands sympathize with the insurgents ; only those natives whose immediate self-interest requires it are friendly to us. The insurgent army is in no way ready to give in, and its policy of retreating is the one best adapted to the accomplishment of its ends.

"There have been only half a dozen natives who have been in confidential relations with the American Government here, and most of these, especially those formerly connected with the insurgent government, I believe to be spies of the enemy. It is a standing joke with the officers along the line that when the authorities send out word that there is going to be an attack on their forces at any one point, they may be sure that no attack will take place at the time specified. The most important moves of the insurgents have not reached the secret service department until after they have occurred. . . . In every part of the islands where our ships have gone they have found only hostile natives, who acknowledged no allegiance save to the in-

urgent government. We find it of the utmost difficulty to get guides to show us the way. Experienced native pilots of our gunboats suddenly become ignorant of the character of the lake, the river, and the bay, unexpectedly forgetting the position of the sand bars. The authorities actually believe that the people are tired of the insurrection, and would like to come under the American rule if they could only get rid of their chiefs and their army. Yet the half-past six o'clock rule is still on in Manila, and everybody must be indoors, because the authorities are still afraid of an uprising in the town. The sooner the people of the United States find out that the people of the Philippines do not wish to be governed by us, the better they will be fitted to cope with the great problem out here."

In the *Outlook* for April 14 a letter from Mr. Phelps Whitmarsh is published which contains the following remarkable statements :

"Civil authorities, local and provincial presidentes, all appointed by American authority and professing allegiance to that

authority are known to be insurgent informers and traitors; *assemblies* are again established in all the principal towns; and General Otis has admitted to me that the Hong Kong and Manila juntas were never more active than they are to-day. Everywhere the insurrectos are reorganizing or preparing for it. Everywhere when one gets beneath the polished surface one finds the same old hatred towards the Americans and the same hope and belief in ultimate independence. With the exception of a mere handful too insignificant to be considered, every Filipino in his heart is an insurrecto and wishes to drive the Americans from the islands."

General Anderson writes in an article published in the *North American Review* :

"The prevailing sentiment of the Filipinos towards us can be shown by one incident:

"About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in Cavité invited a number of our army officers to a banquet. There was some post-prandial speech-making, the substance of the Filipinos' talk being that they wished to be annexed, but not conquered. One of

our officers in reply assured them that we had not come to make them slaves, but free men. A singular scene followed ; all the Filipinos rose to their feet, and Baron Can-nivo, taking his wine-glass in his hand, said, 'We wish to be baptized to that sentiment.' Then he and the rest poured the wine from their glasses over their heads."

Yet President McKinley says in his message :

"I had every reason to believe, and I still believe, that this transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino people."

Taken in connection with this statement, the following despatch is of interest :

"HONG KONG, July 22, 1898.

"SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington :

"The following is for the Secretary of War :

"Aguinaldo declares dictatorship and martial law over the islands. *The people expect independence.* (Author's italics.) . . .

"ANDERSON, COMMANDING,

"DEWEY."

Were this not enough to show what is the real sentiment of the most active and influential of the Filipinos, what interpretation are we to place upon the fact that it has been necessary to send more than sixty thousand troops to the Philippine Islands in order to prosecute the war, while even with this great force in active operation the war continues?— If the Filipinos were really anxious for our sovereignty, why have they not, under our leadership, organized a native force to put down that infinitesimally small body of malcontents under Aguinaldo which disturbed the public peace and hindered the mass of the people from obtaining the boon of American rule? Or why was it that so many instances are reported of the treachery of native officials towards us? The experiment of local self-government imposed by American arms has not, eighteen months after our military rule began,

been a brilliant success. Some of our Americanized Filipino mayors have scarcely assumed their robes of office, when we have been obliged to lock them up in jail for corresponding with the "rebels," for recruiting soldiers for the enemy, or holding a commission in Aguinaldo's army. As late as the middle of March, at the very moment when a distinguished American Bishop returned from a few days' residence in Manila to tell his countrymen that the war was practically over, General Otis himself reports renewed activity among the Filipino leaders, that it is unsafe to travel from one town to another, and that Manila is the principal seat of trouble. The conservative and experienced correspondent of the *Evening Post*, Mr. A. G. Robinson, brings to an end a valuable series of letters, full of important information, with the statement that after eighteen months of American military rule some of the

most serious abuses which originally provoked Filipino insurrection against Spain, and which undoubtedly are responsible for its continuance against us, still exist ; that Spanish taxes, Spanish laws, and, worse than either of these, Spanish friars still remain. The American people, Mr. Robinson concludes, can secure peace whenever they choose to do so by returning to American principles, by granting to these Filipinos a reasonable measure of political rights, and the removal of the glaring abuses mentioned. Without taking these steps, he tells us, the outlook is "gloomy indeed."

And why should such steps not be taken? What hinders the people of the United States from declaring immediately by the voice of Congress that the people of the Philippine Islands "are and of right ought to be free and independent," that our interference with the rule of Spain in these

islands was not for the purpose of forcible annexation, which under our code of morals would be "criminal aggression," but that it was to establish liberty and order there, as in Cuba? Such a declaration, it is true, would come late; it could not bring to life the thousands who have been slain because it was not spoken at an earlier day; but it may yet save the lives of thousands who will otherwise die by violence or disease. To make such a declaration would instantly render us consistent with ourselves, with American traditions, and with our declared purpose in entering the Spanish war. It would at once offer a basis of co-operation with the insurgent chiefs, whom, up to this time, we have treated on the false assumption that they are "rebels." They are not rebels, but vindicators of their own political rights. They know that we declared Spain's title to Cuba void because of her per-

sistently cruel and incompetent government. It was wholly on that assumption that we asserted our right to destroy her authority by force of arms. They know that we deliberately—not by a chance—broke down her authority in the Philippines, where her government had been, if possible, more cruel, more incompetent, than in Cuba. Hence, according to our own logic, no more valid title remained to Spain in the East Indies than in the West Indies.

The Filipinos know that our pretence to the right to purchase such a title, for which we paid the price of twenty million dollars, and thus to gain sovereignty over them, is a monstrous falsehood. They know that the stigma of rebellion put upon them ever since, because they denied the justice of our claims, is equally false and unjust. Why should we not now confess our error, or, to speak more

accurately, our sin, and invite them to talk the matter over, not on the false basis of master to subject, but of man to man? Again and again they have asked us to do this, but General Otis, the military representative of President McKinley, has as often refused the request, saying that he will have nothing short of "unconditional surrender." Can we do less than this? If a nation's hands ever were stained with innocent blood, wantonly shed to make good a groundless claim, ours certainly are. We may seek to clothe the truth with attractive and clever sophistries, but it still stands naked before us. We have been guilty of a great national sin. We should beware of adding to that sin, as its disastrous consequences begin to pile upon us, by refusing to consider it or to repent of it. We should repair the mischief which we have wrought.

The immediate result of a general

declaration of political rights such as is suggested would probably be a cessation of hostilities. Then would come a conference with all the insurgent chiefs in arms against us. Sir Andrew Clark has already told us that to deal with these people successfully we must act through their own leaders,—those in whom they have confidence, and who represent their aspirations.

When we have once come to friendly relations with the Filipino leaders and are ready to hear what they have to ask of us, we shall probably be called on to do just what Mr. A. G. Robinson and so many others have asserted. We shall be asked to remedy the terrible abuses connected with the monastic establishments in the islands. What the Filipinos always asked Spanish governors fruitlessly, they will ask us,—let us hope successfully. This will probably result in most of the obnoxious friars going back to Spain.

When they find that a vigorous inquiry is about to be made into the validity of the titles by which they hold the immensely valuable lands of their Philippine establishments, they will realize the fact that a missionary life in foreign parts has lost its principal charm for them. This feeling will be further strengthened by the knowledge that the United States will not so far step into Spain's shoes as to pay them salaries for the performance of their ecclesiastical duties. For such support they hope now, while on the other hand the fear that our government will assume this relationship towards them is one great factor in promoting distrust and antagonism in the minds of the Filipinos towards us.

The very fact that a Papal Legate, Archbishop Chapelle, who is also understood by the Filipinos to represent President McKinley, is in the island of Luzon, and that his purpose is sup-

posed to be the maintenance of the monastic establishment on the same basis upon which they rested during the Spanish *régime*, gives strength to the belief of the Filipinos that it is the intention of our government to maintain the friars in authority over them. It is not claimed that this question of the mendicant orders is not fraught with difficulties. It would require a firm hand, a high order of judgment, and a highly developed sense of justice to deal with and settle it. A plant whose roots have burrowed the soil for three hundred years would be hard to pluck up.

But the work, though difficult, could be performed. It is evident that it must be done if peace and prosperity are to come to the Philippines. The very declaration that we intended to meet the difficulty promptly and courageously would go a long way towards removing it. What is needed

immediately is a declaration by Congress assuring the Filipinos that their political rights will be respected, and telling the friars plainly that they can expect neither salaries nor support from the United States Government. This would at once tend to re-establish the lost confidence of the Filipinos in us. It would open the way for a full and judicial inquiry into the facts of this question of the mendicant orders. The friars themselves, and their outside supporters, should, of course, be given the fullest opportunity to render testimony in their own defence. They should have a full chance to meet and, if possible, rebut the charges of appropriation of lands, of cruelty, of immorality, of merciless taxation which have been preferred by apparently reliable authorities against them. They could thus fully explain the part which they took in the suppression of the insurrection of 1896, and

the charge made against them of promoting arrests without evidence, of the use of mediæval tortures to procure confessions of guilt, and of other alleged irregularities, which now cast so dark a shadow upon their name and upon the name of Christianity through them.

But the opponents and accusers of the friars would also have an equal chance to be heard. Those Filipinos who had reason to remember the heavy hand of Archbishop Nozaleda could come forward without fear to tell their story. Such a procedure would show the Filipinos that they need not infer from the presence of Nozaleda in the place of honor at the reception given by Archbishop Chappelle, or from the prominence of the Spanish prelate during General Otis's *régime*, that he and the friars were to continue as the especial *protégés* of the United States Government. We would accord due

protection to friars and Filipinos, but not a protection of such a partisan nature as would prevent disclosure of the full truth. Aguinaldo himself, in such a searching inquiry, would be given the chance to show what made him believe and assert that Nozaleda had tried to have him assassinated. If the accuser could prove his case, the public would know just what to think of Archbishop Nozaleda, and if not, but supposing the accused man could show that he was the victim of a monstrous libel, then everybody would know just what to think of Aguinaldo. His influence among his own people (which is now perhaps the greatest obstacle to peace with us) would decline, and in the easiest possible way we should have broken the power of the insurgent leader. At such an inquiry, the Spanish archives, recording the dark deeds of centuries of absolutism, would be brought fully to the

light. We could gather much that would be of the greatest value relating to the acts of Spanish governors, concerning the causes of past rebellions, and especially the alleged overruling by the friars of the plans which some of the most enlightened and humane of the governors tried to carry out for the benefit of the natives. The world would learn just why Governor-General Don Emilio Despujols, Condé de Caspe, was not permitted to carry out the important reforms in which he was engaged; why that system of exact justice towards ecclesiastics, Spaniards, and Filipinos which he instituted was interrupted; and why he was recalled by the Spanish Government. We should ascertain why the humane Blanco was superseded by the cruel Polavieja, and why José Rizal, and many more like him, were executed; in fine, such a judicial inquiry as this would summon all hidden or disputed

facts into the light for consideration and judgment. What better means could be adopted to conserve for the future benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands all of true religion, useful knowledge, and humanizing influences of which the monastic orders are possessed? This would remove abuses which now excite the Filipinos to a ferment of insurrection, or keep alive in their minds dangerous hidden enmity against us. By taking these steps promptly and in logical sequence the United States will most readily attain peace and order in the Philippines.

The country now faces the question : How can Congress be induced to take action towards this end in time to stop further bloodshed? President McKinley cannot be expected to take such action, for it is contrary to the policy inaugurated by him and which he has steadily pursued. It would

seem that grave political reasons and the demands of great trusts and monopolies are wholly opposed to it. This is not the policy of that commercial exploitation to which the administration is committed. The Sugar Trust and the tobacco interests have already given the clear demonstration of their power to dictate a tariff for Porto Rico, even though such policy means starvation to the Porto Ricans and is contrary to that "plain duty" towards the islands which the President advocated in his message. It would, therefore, seem idle to look directly for relief and the adoption of wise measures either to the Executive or to the Republican majority in Congress. But both the President and Congress may be influenced by a direct appeal to public sentiment, which is, after all, in a representative government, always the reservoir of power,—the court of last appeal. Towards this

end, then, believers in American institutions, and those who desire peace to succeed war, should exert themselves. It may be that beneficial action of some kind may be secured previous to the November election. But how shall we reach public sentiment? How convince the people and arouse them to action in time? Only by calm, earnest appeal to reason, through legitimate argument, through a rehearsal of the facts so clear that the plain, religious-minded, honest but hard-worked American citizen shall become convinced of the truth, his conscience be touched, and he himself be stirred to action.

The typical American is a religious and conscientious man. Self-interest, or partisanship, or ignorance may blind his eyes to duty for the time, but not for long. It is possible to pierce through the outer defences of his mind and heart so as to reach his reason and

conscience. Clearly or dimly he believes in God, in the moral law which God has established in the world. He is hopeful of a greater and more perfect conformity to that law on man's part as the centuries roll on. He does not desire to be led astray by that fatalistic fallacy which proclaims a destiny denying free agency to man. He believes that duty is a reality, and that it is possible for nations as for men to perform it. He will do his duty if he once clearly sees it.

CHAPTER III.

THE preceding chapters have dealt with events, occurring in the recent history of the United States and of the Philippine Islands, which of necessity deeply affect the welfare of an alien people. That is the first and most obvious fact forced home upon the mind and conscience of the reader of this story.

There is in this situation a strong appeal to our pity, born of a knowledge of what our nation, acting through its chosen representatives, has done in the Philippines during the last two years. The story must awaken in the minds of those who profess to obey and to love the moral law a sense of shame and regret, and a desire to offer

some fitting restitution to those who have suffered at our hands. This is the first thought prompted by a fairly accurate knowledge of the truth, and it alone should be strong enough to spur us to prompt remedial action.

But there is a second thought, of equally deep significance. The work we have been engaged in will have far broader and more lasting consequences for evil than is to be found in the harm done to eight million Asiatics.

The policy of imperialism, once definitely entered upon by the United States, means nothing short of a permanent abandonment of those great ideals of responsibility, liberty, and growth for the individual citizen which inspired our fathers to the sacrifices that created the republic, and which, through storm and stress and temporary eclipse, have sustained the hopes of those who have preserved it. If we finally conclude that political free-

dom, and the strength and self-reliance which come to men when they possess and use it wisely, are only the right of the strong,—that they are not universal and inalienable rights,—then it must be clear to all that the cornerstone of the temple of American liberty is destroyed. Once having committed ourselves to a denial of this proposition in its application to others abroad, it can be but a question of time when we shall deny it also for certain classes at home. If we determine that certain men in the Orient are incapable of self-government, and that we have the right to use physical force to compel them to accept our rule, there is nothing to prevent bodies of men in our country, who, by combinations of wealth and indifference to moral considerations, seek to control legislatures and executives, from enforcing the same right of the strongest upon those of their fellow-citizens

who are too weak to resist. This will be the inevitable conclusion from which we shall in vain try to escape.

The truth of Lincoln's aphorism will be verified: "Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves, and, under a just God, cannot long retain it." America will have over-reached herself; betrayed by greed and ambition at the very moment when she had fallen on her knees in the act of self-worship because of her vaunted possession of unselfish virtue, unknown to the Old World.

But there is a third thought which impresses lovers of true civilization still more powerfully, and which should stimulate more vigorously than either of the preceding ones to remedial action. Up to this moment, America has stood as the world's watch-tower and stronghold of liberty and equality. She has furnished an asylum for the oppressed of other

nations ; but still more important than that, she has been a land shielded by the broad arms of kindly seas, where the great experiment of democracy might be brought to a rich and fruitful issue ; where the man who carried the hoe, and he who guided the loom, should become mightier than the man who, backed by armed force, bears the sceptre.

This dream, "the loveliest and the last," will vanish with the triumph of imperialism. If the prize is to be awarded to the strongest, the defence of the weak will be broken down, and the hope which cheered him when all others were denied will disappear. We cannot have both kinds of strength ; they are incompatible.

The hope, too, or dream, as some would call it, of peace between nations which can never be realized excepting by the steady evolution of the powers of the human heart and brain to that

point of development where love shall have been discovered to be a better motive and guide for every form of human activity than force,—that beautiful dream, which seemed almost able to retain its form in the clear light of common day, will have become transformed into the nightmare of universal anarchistic hate and violence. There will be nothing left in all the world—economic, political, social—but huge primæval forms of selfishness, ceaselessly devouring each other, and, acting under the law of that demon of force and greed whom they have chosen to rule over them, unable to check their monstrous appetite. It seems incredible that the United States, founded for the nurture of human liberty, based on belief in a God of righteousness and love, and consecrated to the mission of preserving and promoting human equality, is ready to take the downward path.

It is well to inquire, seriously, wherein lies the principal strength of the imperialistic movement in the United States,—a movement which has made us responsible for so much loss and bloodshed, and now stretches about us a lowering and stormy horizon. There is no question to which a correct answer is more urgently called for. If we know the cause of trouble, we may be able to apply a remedy. Greed, ambition, and the intoxication of successful war have all played their part in tempting the nation to where it now stands, and in inducing it to exchange what were once generally accepted principles for a policy of opportunism and conquest such as we had in the past pitied or derided other nations for adopting.

There is, however, a far deeper and more subtle cause for our present attitude than may be found in the perennial schemes of ambitious and un-

principled men. The country never could have been led into the imperialistic policy had not a very large number of her sober-minded, virtuous, and religious citizens approved, or at least tolerated, the change. It cannot be denied that great numbers of the religious and thoughtful men of the country, including the religious teachers of various creeds, openly or covertly approved what was being done. How is their attitude to be accounted for, and how can they be brought to see the disastrous consequences of the present policy, and so be prevailed upon to change it?

The fundamental difficulty in this case seems to lie partly in the failure of a majority of our religious teachers, most of whom profess some form of Christianity, to grasp the cardinal principle of Christ's teaching, which is justice and love as opposed to arbitrary force; and partly in their lack

of training in that close, untiring observation of public affairs which is necessary in order to detect the hand of human manipulation in events which the careless, superficial observer attributes to God or Destiny. Because of the former reason, thousands of influential and excellent men are led to approve violent and immoral means for the accomplishment of benevolent or religious ends ; or even to approve the accomplishment of unworthy ends when they are sought by their mercenary fellow-citizens because they hope that, incidentally, good results will follow. Mistakes or even greed may have caused the Philippine war, but, nevertheless, Christianity will be spread by it ; the heathen world will be better and more quickly opened to the spread of Christianity, even though for the moment the barbarities and sufferings of war must be endured. Such reasoning seems to deny the

fundamental principle of all ethical religions, which teach that man's acts should be controlled by the law of justice to one's neighbor, and that we are not justified in violating that law because we assume that incidental benefits attend its violation. Through failure to observe closely the precise facts of the swift-moving drama, many of the events of which are shrouded for the time in darkness, good men often fail to see how all the good results which they hope to attain, even by violent and unjust means, could have been had through just and peaceable ones.

This wide-spread fallacy is as dangerous as it is subtle. Unless it can be exposed so effectually that men perceive its true nature and avoid it henceforth, the hope of the future, which is dependent on increasing justice, peace, and industrial progress in the world, is put in jeopardy. If

the present drift continues, the world's movement will not be forward, but backward towards the ancient barbarism of the armed camp. What is needed for the future is a closer union of religion and ethics. It has been evident during these past two years that many men, professing themselves Christian, accept a code of morals in such crises as this wholly opposed to Christ's teachings, as it certainly was foreign to His practice; while many others, professing no faith whatever in revealed religion, advocate a policy entirely consistent with the loving and just Gospel of the Great Teacher. It is hard to explain so anomalous a condition of affairs on any purely intellectual hypothesis. Perhaps the most satisfactory explanation of it may be found in the supposition that for one cause or another those from whom we could naturally expect the most complete exposition of the ethical

teaching of Christ have not fully apprehended its peculiar nature. Christianity is essentially a moral force. It is inseparable from the highest standards of justice. Proceeding, as the Christian believes, from an unfathomable Divine love, it, therefore, of necessity, in communicating its purpose to mankind, speaks a language of love which is intelligible to the hearts of all, even though they may dissent from other parts of its doctrine. We do not yet realize the practical value of this great force, as until recently we were ignorant of the value of electricity to the physical needs of man. A fact of the most vital importance seems to have been lost sight of by the great majority of the professed teachers of religion among us: it is that the ethical standards by which men actually govern their conduct are elevated very slowly, so that some of the most vital and funda-

mental principles of even Christian morals are as yet imperfectly applied to practical life. One of the most vital functions, therefore, of the minister of religion is to lead men steadily forward towards a fuller and more complete practice of that standard of morals which their religion teaches and which they profess to observe. This important work can only be done by those who have the courage to show their hearers how ethical standards can be applied to current events. The ministers of religion in the United States would seem at this time to have let a great chance for moral leadership slip by. What is most needed would seem to be, not so much multiplication of the professed teachers of religion, as of its actual practitioners. It has been forgotten that the harvest of moral progress is best reaped at precisely that moment of crisis when moral danger most seriously threatens. It is

in the hour when the assaults of passion or folly in some of their varied forms are made, which at one time attack the individual man and, at another, the nation, that the warning and inspiration of the preacher of truth is most needed.

Nearly all reasonable men admit in the time of peace, or when only wars in which they have no concern are being waged, that war is a great evil, and that they would gladly see it supplanted by some reasonable and peaceful method of settling international disputes, such as a court of arbitration offers. But the same persons,—let us suppose them Christians, in order to strengthen the argument,—when the nation of which they are a part is slipping into the whirlpool of war, will do nothing to arrest its progress. They abandon any attempt to apply the principles, which formerly they professed, to the government of

the case of their own nation. They refuse, as though it were disloyal, to make a careful consideration of the facts of the particular conflict under consideration, and content themselves with the vague generalization, "There are some things worse than war." Their purpose seems to be to draw their opponent away from a discussion which, if calmly and sincerely conducted, might be profitable,—viz., whether the war in question is right or wrong—to debate the unsatisfactory topic whether there is anything worse than war. It is clear that but slight moral progress can be made, even towards a condition of less frequent war, unless the professors of ethical religion are willing to lend their aid towards outlawing such wars as they themselves admit have no moral justification. If they will not even take this moderate step forward, then, indeed, little help can be expected from

them towards abating those evils which are inseparable from war, no matter how flawlessly orthodox may be their creeds, or how rich and beautiful the services through which they worship the Divine Father. If we determine that the cause we have in hand is a valid one and worthy of serious effort, we must turn for aid and comfort to those who, without profession of belief in a revealed religion, at least gladly perform some of the most notable of those good works which it enjoins. While religious men are felicitating themselves upon being "the children of Abraham," although they remain indifferent to certain of the great obligations which such a lineage entails, the warning long ago given should not be forgotten, that God is able to "raise up children unto Abraham" out of the very stones if the needs of His service require it.

CHAPTER IV.

“And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you ; yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear : your hands are full of blood.”—ISAIAH i. 15.

THE inspired poetry of Isaiah is full of lofty ideas cloaked in rich and striking imagery. It breathes thoughts which search the perverted human heart to-day, after the lapse of centuries, as they did when poured out in lamentation and upbraiding upon the people to whom the writer immediately appealed. This message of the great Hebrew prophet, so suffused with deep feeling, so fragrant with the sorrow of the soul that gave birth to it under a Divine impulsion, has that distinguishing note struck by the greatest of prophets and poets,—the

power of universal appeal. When times of great popular bewilderment and error come again to men, these utterances of the Hebrew poet renew their youth. They strike a chord in the human breast that had long ceased to vibrate, and awaken consciences which have long sunk into deadly stupor.

It is true that thousands sitting in the formality of our churches may listen unmoved to such words, finding in them no more beauty or power, being no more aroused by them than in listening to a dry chronology. The organ tones of the most exalted poetry affect them no more than does the monotonous record of unimportant facts. Regarding both as of inspired origin, they give to both an equally reverent attention, but they are no more stirred to activity by the spiritual power of the one than they are wearied by the prosaic quality of the other. Notwithstanding this indifference,

which may mark as well the priest at the altar as the plain layman in the pew, there is a "remnant," similar to that which Isaiah could count upon in his day among his people, from whom can be expected a sympathetic hearing, whose attention is chained by these words, whose consciences are awakened, and who, by some means, discern their application and perceive that they are spoken to them.

Such is the function of the greatest of Hebrew poetry. Its power is ethical. It not only kindles the imagination by its imagery, or awakens the intellect with its solemn and sublime thoughts, or pleases the ear with its music ; it appeals to the heart and the conscience. It carries a message at the time when a message is needed. It deals with the existence of sin. It unfolds the mystery of iniquity as an actual force in the world. Man may see his own distorted image in the

mirror which the prophet holds before him, and, notwithstanding the hideous aspect of those contorted features, which passion, greed, and ambition have changed from their natural symmetry of line, he may recognize himself in what he sees. Shakespeare, in the tragedy of Macbeth, has a message for the student of humanity somewhat similar to that of Isaiah. He depicts, with a power large in outline, finely finished in detail, the movement of a crime of ambition, from its apparently pure beginning in loyalty to duty, on through unlawful desire for a crown, to meditations upon murder for obtaining it,—to murder itself; then through more murders, perpetrated to conceal the first, on to a violent, unrepentant death. The perennial interest which attaches to this gloomy masterpiece of the great dramatist, the field of study which the creation of his genius opens to every

new generation of thoughtful and imaginative minds, attest its truth to nature, its intellectual greatness. But it does not bring to us so distinct and personal a message as that which flows into our very heart from the glowing pen of Isaiah, like molten metal into the precise form that it is destined to fill.

The distinction has often been drawn between the functions of the Jewish prophet and the Jewish priest. The priest, as the appointed ministrant of an elaborate and impressive ritual, might be and often was but little concerned with those profound questions of human conduct which it was the prophet's function to consider, and, under the inspiration of God, to pronounce upon to the people. The prophet was a man whose heart God had touched; who was profoundly concerned with what the people of God were thinking and doing, whether in

their individual lives or in their collective capacity as members of the nation. His lips were touched by the living coal from the altar. His message was strongly political in its character, and he pronounced judgment most unequivocal, most unsparing, upon the acts of the men about him. While passing events were hot enough to be malleable, he smote them with the hammer of God's wrath, or, in accents most tender and persuasive, urged men to repent and amend their doings. He showed an intense earnestness in his effort to conform the public and private deeds of his time to a severe ethical standard. If it is wrong to preach politics in the high and true sense of that word, then such a prophet as Isaiah was a great sinner. His conception of the Divine Being was of One intensely concerned in the welfare of His people, and determined that His law of righteousness should con-

trol their personal and national life. Isaiah, as poet and prophet, expresses the indignation of God at the hypocrisy which made the people especially careful about ritual observances or sacrifices, at the very moment when they were most indifferent to violations of the moral law. "To what purpose," the prophet exclaims, "is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? Saith the Lord, I am full of the burnt offerings of rams and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he goats." The strongest emphasis is placed on the extreme importance of the ethical law by depicting the Almighty as disgusted and angry at services not only meant to do Him honor, but actually instituted by His command. In what more powerful or dramatic way could God's estimate be shown of the worthlessness of all religious activity or ritual observances

which cloak the immoral and vicious life, or which enable men with flip-pant smile to look idly upon national deeds of violence and injustice? And yet it seems as though men could never learn the lesson in this respect of which both the Old and the New Testaments are full. Like the burning denunciation of God speaking through Isaiah is that of the Christ Himself denouncing hypocrisy, and again asserting that the moral law is the only basis of all religion that is acceptable in God's sight. The summary of those Ten Commandments, on which the religion of Jesus Christ is immutably built, He Himself defined as love towards God and love towards man. Whenever, therefore, men's acts are in violation of those eternal principles, the corruption of sin enters into them; no matter how men may seek to disguise the ugly truth from their eyes, or may try to persuade

themselves that they are really honoring God by an outward service, the evil within them spreads its poison, vitiating all that would otherwise be acceptable. "It is an iniquity, even this solemn meeting," exclaims Isaiah, speaking for God,—and then with what power he continues, "And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you; yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear: your hands are full of blood." Isaiah's vision, which he gave to the people, was not of wickedness which had been committed before his own time. It was spoken of the men immediately about him. It was in the time of contemporaneous kings,—in the days of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah, kings of Judah. In so speaking, the prophet would have to reckon with these living, strong men, whose hands he declared to be "full of blood." This element of courage must always enter

into the greatest examples of public utterance. Sublimity of appeal can only be reached when there is loss to be encountered in making it, and when the life through which it issues is pure. The men who profoundly move their fellows, whose work is most lasting, are not the priestly rhetoricians who tickle, for a time, the ears of the crowd with bright thoughts, with pithy epigrams or sounding periods, but who do not dare to risk their popularity by a plain enunciation of the truth, which their generation, at a great crisis, most needs. They are those who see only a necessary truth in danger of concealment, and who at all hazards publish it.

But what man, who sees a great wrong in process of consummation, will not lift up his voice with such power as he may be possessed of to warn those who will listen to him of what is going on? He must do this

at whatever cost, if the cause of truth is dear to him; if, as in the case of this Philippine war, men's lives and his country's honor and welfare hang in the balance. If the prophet Isaiah brought God's voice to bear on the political questions of his day, when the invasion of Sennacherib or the intrigues of Egypt threatened Israel, so the citizen in his sovereign capacity in the modern United States, in the closing days of the nineteenth century, who loves the right, must boldly appeal to the ancient immutable ethical law of God. The American citizen has authority to hold this law before men's eyes, forgetful of his own littleness, and without fear of presumption, in protest against the great wrong daily committed. Just as Isaiah nailed his prophetic poems in the public places where the whole people might read the message, so he may take the commandments of God, which the Divine Spirit

heats into glowing oracles within the heart of any one who believes in them, and must measure the unjust acts of the present time by their perfect rectitude. He must face the national sin and speak against it with a "Thus saith the Lord." God's word is not spoken as a rebuke to sin long passed that has no need of further censure,—we kick not the dead lion,—but to the sin of our own time. From its chastisement some good may come.

There are some to whom the argument of this closing chapter may at first appeal with little force, because they are doubtful about accepting the theory of inspiration on which it is based. How do we know, they query, that God spoke through the Jewish poet Isaiah to the people of his time and nation? And supposing that He did so speak, is an application of Isaiah's denunciations to contemporaneous events in the United States—

beautiful, majestic though they be—justified?

It has seemed to the writer that, whether certain of his readers accept, or hold in suspense, or reject the belief that the Divine Spirit spoke through Isaiah, or whether they believe that the prophet's burning words had, as would seem to them, a more direct and personal origin, their power and their application to our own deeds should not be materially affected in the minds of all those who accept moral law for the regulation of human conduct. A belief, sincere and unswerving, in the supreme authority of the moral law is, after all, a necessary preliminary to any serious consideration of such a question as has been treated in these pages. Without such a belief, cruelty and kindness, justice and injustice, right and wrong, are idle terms, having no fixed and precise meaning; while the acts which

they represent so completely lose their importance that it is not worth while in the hurry of life to spend thought and effort upon them. Then let the mandates of chance and blind folly issue from the mysterious depths of the unknown; let men suffer or rejoice, let them triumph over their fellows, or writhe helpless under the heel of conscienceless power! Those who accept such a philosophy are naturally indifferent to all questions of the class to which that of the Philippines belongs. To them, obviously, the foregoing pages are not addressed. But minds which accept the ethical standard at all, who believe in an exact law of right and wrong, and who wish to see that law extend its beneficent sway, not over men's personal lives alone, but over the entire realm of their relationship with their fellows, must, if they accept the facts of our Philippine war as the author has pre-

sented them, feel that Isaiah's awful tones of denunciation and warning—let them proceed from the heart of the Divine righteousness itself or only from the lesser human conscience—reach far beyond their original hearers, beyond the narrow confines of Judea as it existed seven hundred years before Christ, to deliver their message to the newest nation of the latest times.

APPENDIX



NOTE I.

MUCH light is thrown upon the oppressions the Tagals suffered under Spanish rule, and the baneful influence the friars exerted upon them and upon Spanish authorities in the islands, in an article written by Frederick H. Sawyer, a member of the Institute of Civil Engineers. It is entitled, "The Tagal: His Abilities, and Why he rebelled," and appeared in Senate Document No. 62. He said, in part:

"I resided in Luzon fourteen years, visiting all the central and southern provinces, and made trips to Mindoro, Iloilo, Cebu, Calayan, and Calamianes. My profession as colonial engineer brought me into contact with all classes of the community, from the land-owner or planter to the laborers or mechanics who worked under my direction. . . . I think the Tagals and other natives might be easily governed. Latterly they

have shown themselves rebellious against the Spanish government, and especially against the priests, but the causes are not far to seek. In former times, when communication with Spain was by sailing-vessel around the Cape, the number of Spanish in this island was small. Each province was under an *alcalde* (mayor), who was both governor and judge. . . . All the wealthy parishes had Spanish monks as parish priests, the poor ones had native clergy. The government was carried on by the old 'Leyes de Indias.' By these wise laws the natives were afforded great protection against extortion. . . . These laws also conferred upon the native the perpetual usufruct of all the land that he cleared and cultivated, and he could not be removed from it. In consequence, most of the cultivated land in Luzon to-day is the property of the natives. . . . The taxes were light, the principal one being a poll-tax, called the 'Tribute.' The customs duties were light, and the machinery for the sugar plantations came in free of duty. A friendly feeling then existed between the Spaniards and the natives ; the maintenance of such an economical administration was not burdensome to the latter. . . . With the

opening of the Suez Canal and the subsequent establishment of a Spanish line of steamers all this changed. Hordes of hungry Spaniards arrived by every line of steamers, for whom places must be found. A bureaucratic administration was gradually substituted for the old paternal régime."

The writer then describes in detail the creation of fictitious departments, bureaus, and offices to meet the greedy demand, and the consequent steadily increasing burden of taxation on the people.

"Additional and useless ships and troops were provided on the Philippine establishment, and unnecessary little wars were got up against the Sultan of Iola and the dattos of Mindanao. These expeditions involved great loss of life from fever among the troops and great expense to the treasury. They provided, however, pickings for the officials and profits to contractors. . . . The rich were blackmailed under threats of being reported as disaffected, while the poor suffered from illegal exactions. . . . Serious agrarian troubles arose between the monastic orders and the tenants on their vast estates. Towards the end of General Weyler's government a perilous state of

unrest prevailed. But the arrival of General Don Emilio Despujols, Condé de Caspe, to take over the government soon produced better feeling. He meted out justice alike to priest and tenant, to Spaniard and native. . . . The natives, seeing justice done them for the first time, became most fervent admirers of Condé de Caspe, whom they looked upon as a savior. He became the idol of the people. This state of things was unfortunately of short duration, *for the priests, seeing that he was not their champion, obtained his recall by cable. It is said that they paid one hundred thousand dollars in Madrid to obtain this.* [Editor's italics.] His departure was a wonderful sight. Never had there been such demonstration of affection to a Governor-General. Innumerable multitudes of natives crowded the shores to see him embark, and every steamer belonging to the port accompanied him far out to sea. With the sudden departure of Condé there settled down on the native mind the gloomy conviction that force alone could plead their cause, and that their only hope was to rise in arms."

The statement of General Charles A. Whittier, U.S.V., before the United States

Peace Commission at Paris, reported in Senate Document 62, page 498, also bears on this point. He said :

“I went to Manila without prejudice against the Spaniards there. . . . ; their actions in battle and in civil administration all convince me that they are without principle or courage, and brutally, wickedly cruel, with no improvement over 325 years ago in the days of Philip II.” . . . “The shooting in the Lunetta (their favorite driveway) of dozens of so-called rebels and conspirators, notably Dr. Rizal, a man of literary merit, with no trial, vague charges of belonging to secret societies, with the hope of making their victims confess to what in many cases did not exist, was made a fête, advertised in the papers, ‘There will be music,’ and, I have been frequently told, that women and children attended in their carriages. The tortures inflicted with the same view of eliciting confessions are too brutal to commit the narrative to paper.” . . . “The rapacity, stealing, and immorality of the priests are beyond question, and the bitterness of the natives against them has been caused and aggravated by years of iniquity. To demand a daughter or a wife from a

native has been a common occurrence. Failing to obtain acquiescence, the husband's, or father's, goods have been seized, he deported or thrown into jail under an order easily obtained from the government in Manila. The priest's influence was paramount—they are rich, and fathers (not only of the church) despised and hated by the people."

The following extracts from Mr. John Foreman's book, "The Philippine Islands," bear directly on this subject :

"The mysterious deaths of General Solano (in August, 1860) and of Zamora, the Bishop-elect of Cebu (in 1873), occurred so opportunely for Philippine monastic ambition, that little doubt existed in the public mind as to who were the real criminals. When I first arrived in Manila, nearly twenty years ago, a fearful crime was still being commented on. Father Piernavieja, formerly parish priest of San Miguel de Mayumo, had recently committed a second murder. His first victim was a native youth, his second a native woman enceinte. The public voice could not be raised very loudly there against the priests, but the scandal was so great that the criminal friar

was sent to another province—Cavité—where he still celebrated the holy sacrifice of the Eucharist. Nearly two decades afterwards—in January 1897—this rascal met with a terrible death at the hands of the rebels.” (Page 219.)

“I knew a money-grabbing parish priest—a friar—who publicly announced raffles from the pulpit of the church from which he preached morality and devotion. On one occasion a \$200 watch was put up for \$500, at another time he raffled dresses for the women. Under the pretext of being a pious institution, he established a society of women, called the Association of St. Joseph (Cofradia de San José), upon whom he imposed the very secular duties of domestic service in the convent and raffle-ticket hawking. He had the audacity to dictate to a friend of mine—a planter, Don Leandro L——, the value of the gifts he was to make him; and when the planter was at length wearied of his importunities, he conspired with a Spaniard to deprive my friend of his estate, alleging that he was not the real owner. Failing in this, he stirred up the petty governor and headman against him. The petty governor

was urged to litigation, and when he received an unfavorable sentence, the priest, enraged at the abortive result of his malicious intrigues, actually left his vicarage to accompany his litigious protégé to the chief judge of the province in quest of a reversion of the sentence." (Page 221.)

"Moreover, the religious corporations possessed large private revenues. Their investments in Hong Kong are extensive. The Austin and Dominican Friars in particular held very valuable real property in the provinces near Manila, which was rented out to the native agriculturists on tyrannical conditions. On the Laguna de Bay shore the rent was raised as the natives, at their own expense, improved their holdings. Leases were granted for the nominal term of three years, but the receipts given for the rent were very cunningly worded. Some have been shown to me; neither the amount of money paid, nor the extent of the land rented, nor its situation were mentioned on the document, so that the tenant was constantly at the mercy of the owners. The native planters were much incensed at the treatment they received from these landowners, and their

numerous well-founded complaints formed part of the general outcry against the priesthood. The bailiffs of these corporation lands were unordained brothers of the Order. They resided in the Estate Houses, and by courtesy were styled 'fathers' by the natives. They were under certain religious vows, but, not being entitled to say Mass, they were termed 'legos,' or ignorant men, by their own Order." (Page 226.)

"Each Order had its procurator in Madrid, who took up the cudgels in defence of his corporation's interest in the Philippines whenever this was menaced. On the other hand, the Church, as a body politic, dispensed no charity, but received all. It was always begging; always above civil laws and taxes; claimed immunity, proclaimed poverty, and inculcated in others charity to itself." (Page 226.)

"They were usually taken from the peasantry and families of lowly station. As a rule they had little or no secular education, and, regarding them apart from their religious training, they might be considered a very ignorant class—and the Austins the most polished of all."

“The ecclesiastical archives of the Philippines abound with proofs of the bitter and tenacious strife sustained, not only between the civil and Church authorities, but even among the religious communities themselves.” (Page 227.)

“The Austin Friars attributed to the Jesuits the troubles with the Mussulmans of Mindanao and Sulu, and, in their turn, the Jesuits protested against what they conceived to be the bad policy of the government adopted under the influence of the other Orders in Manila. So distinct were their interests, that the Augustine chronicles refer to the other Orders as different religions.” (Page 227.)

NOTE II.

DR. RIZAL is spoken of in Lieutenant Calkins' article as “A man of science, who was a native of Laguna Province. The family history acknowledged some slight mixture of Chinese blood and some moderate degree of wealth. After passing through the College and University of Manila, José

Rizal went to Europe to complete his medical education. He won the degree of doctor of medicine and doctor of philosophy from Spanish and German Universities, acquiring the knowledge of seven languages, and such proficiency as an oculist that he was made first assistant in the office of a world-known specialist in Vienna."

The charges against Rizal were "agitation for independence" and hostility to Spain since his nineteenth year. He was accused of having written "depreciative phrases" concerning the authorities and the Church in his early novels. Affidavits procured from men in solitary confinement by threats of torture were also read in court. During the last night before his execution Rizal wrote a poem addressed to his country, which is strikingly illustrative of his refinement of sentiment and patriotic feeling.

The following translation of some verses of this poem appeared in the *Springfield Republican* :

"Farewell, adored Fatherland ; our Eden
lost, farewell ;
Farewell, O sun's loved region, pearl of
the eastern sea ;

Gladly I die for thy dear sake ; yea, thou
knowest well
Were my sad life more radiant far than
mortal tongue could tell,
Yet would I give it gladly, joyously for
thee.

“Pray for those who died alone, betrayed
in wretchedness ;
For those who suffered for thy sake tor-
ments and misery ;
For broken hearts of mothers, who weep
in bitterness ;
For widows, tortured captives, orphans
in deep distress ;
And pray for thy dear self, that thou
may'st finally be free.

“Farewell, adored country ; I leave my all
with thee,
Beloved Philippines, whose soil my feet
have trod,
I leave with thee my life's love deep ; I
go where all are free :
I go where are no tortures, where the
oppressor's power shall be
Destroyed, where faith kills not, where
He who reigns is God.”

In 1897, Dr. Ferdinand Blumentritt, Regius Professor in the University of Leimeritz, Austria, prepared a biographical sketch of Dr. Rizal, which was published in a special supplement for the International Archives of Ethnology. This was translated from the original German by Howard W. Bray, who added some notes and an epilogue, and published at Singapore, China, in 1898. Dr. Blumentritt had abundant opportunity to study the life and work of Dr. Rizal, and his statements are based largely on personal observation. He says of him :

“Not only is Rizal the most prominent man of his own people, but the greatest man the Malayan race has produced. His memory will never perish in his fatherland, and future generations of Spaniards will yet learn to utter his name with respect and reverence.”

In this volume Dr. Blumentritt reproduces an article written by Dr. Rizal as a result of his ethnological studies. It is extremely interesting, and shows the writer to be a close student of human nature and a keen observer. He says :

“(4) The disparaging criticism of colored races by Europeans can be understood, but it is by no means justified. No feeble per-

sons wander to exotic lands, but only energetic men who not only come out prejudiced against the native races, but also with the firm conviction that they have been called upon to exercise dominion over them. It is now known what few Europeans know, that the colored races fear the brutality of the white race, and thus the colored race labors under a disadvantage in the service of the former, especially as they, of course, cannot reply to them in printed works. When one further considers that these colored races belong principally to the lower social classes, the verdict of the white race has the same worth as that of an educated Tagal travelling through France and Germany, judging the French and Germans from the milk-maids, servants, waiters, or coachmen.

“(5) The misfortune of the native race is merely due to the color of their skin. In Europe there are many men and women coming from the lowest dregs of society, who have raised themselves to positions of the greatest importance and honor. These self-made men are of two kinds. Some adapt themselves to the surroundings of their new sphere, and their lowly birth is not considered any shame ; on the contrary,

they are honored for being self-made men. Others are the insolent *parvenus*, who are laughed at and despised.

“A colored man generally finds himself in the latter category, however noble and perfect a gentleman he may be, because his face is an unmistakable proof of his descent, causing him to feel himself humiliated owing to the prejudices of the Europeans. They will pick holes in him, and any small slip which would be overlooked in a cobbler’s son who had been created a baron, and which might at any time happen even to a pure-blooded descendant of a Montmorency, would be laughed at with the remark, ‘What could you expect? he is only a colored man!’ Should he be guilty of no breach of etiquette, and be a skilful advocate or a clever physician, this would not be considered a natural matter of course, but he might be admired with the same condescending benevolence as a well-trained poodle, but never as an equal being.

“The circumstance that in the tropics all the domestic servants consist of natives, is responsible, to a great degree, for the disapproving criticism of the colored man. If a German housewife complains about her servants, she would surely not go so far on

that account and accuse the whole German nation of bad qualities, simply because her servants were not orderly. But this is done without the slightest compunction by those Europeans living in the tropics, who then calmly sleep the sleep of the just! Merchants carry their unfavorable prejudices against the colored race still further. They come to the tropics to enrich themselves as quickly as possible. This is only possible when they are able to buy at extremely low prices in the country. The natives, however, consider such transactions not as fair business; they believe the white race are trying to deceive them, and take means on their part also to get the advantage of the European, whilst among themselves they show far more honesty. The Europeans consequently denounce them as liars and deceivers; but that they, as Europeans, unconscientiously prey upon the ignorance of the natives, never appears to enter their heads—on the contrary, the white race believe they are morally entitled to trade with them in immoral ways.”

NOTE III.

AGUINALDO AND CONSUL PRATT.

A DETAILED account of what occurred during the interviews between Aguinaldo and Mr. Pratt was published in the Singapore, China, *Free Press* of May 4, 1898. This Mr. Pratt enclosed with his report to the State Department, with the assurance from him that this statement was "substantially correct." It is as follows:

"Just before the actual outbreak of hostilities between Spain and the United States Singapore has been the scene of a secret political arrangement by which General Emilio Aguinaldo y Fami, the supreme head of the revolutionary movement in the Philippines, has entered into direct relations with Admiral Dewey, Commander of the American squadron in China waters, while that officer was still at Hong Kong.

"In order to understand and appreciate this interesting historical incident properly, it will be necessary to allude to the causes leading to the second appearance of the

rebellion in the Philippines, which was almost coincident with, though not instigated by, the strained relations between Spain and the United States.

“In December last General Primo de Rivera, who above all other Spanish generals has an intimate knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, found the position untenable for both parties. Neither of these had the remotest chance of terminating the rebellion decisively, the rebels secure in their mountain fastnesses, the Spaniards holding the chief towns and villages on the coast. Primo de Rivera therefore sent two well-known Philippine natives occupying high positions in Manila to propose terms of peace to General Aguinaldo in Biac-na Bato. A council of the revolutionary government was held in which it was agreed to lay down arms on condition of certain reforms being introduced. The principal of these were :

“1. The expulsion, or at least secularization, of the religious orders, and the inhibition of these orders from all official vetoes in civil administration.

“2. A general amnesty for all rebels, and guarantees for their personal security and from the vengeance of the friars and

parish priests after returning to their homes.

“3. Radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration.

“4. Freedom of the press to denounce official corruption and blackmailing.

“5. Representation in the Spanish Parliament.

“6. Abolition of the iniquitous system of secret deportation of political suspects, etc.

“Primo de Rivera agreed to these reforms in sum and substance, but made it a condition that the principal rebel leaders must leave the country during his Majesty's pleasure. As these had lost all their property or had it confiscated and plundered, the government agreed to provide them with funds to live in a becoming manner on foreign soil.

“The rebels laid down their arms, and peace was apparently secured, but no sooner had they done so, and returned to their houses, than the intransigent religious orders commenced at once to again persecute them and trump up imaginary charges to procure their re-arrest. The Spanish Government on its side, imagining itself secure, desisted from carrying out the

promised reforms, thinking another trick like that played on the Cubans after the peace of Zanjón, arranged by Martínez Campos, might succeed. The Filipinos, however, with this business before them, refused to be made dupes of, and having taken up arms again, not alone in the immediate districts round Manila but throughout the Archipelago, which merely awaits the signal from Aguinaldo to rise en masse, no doubt carrying with them the native troops hitherto loyal, and for which loyal service they have received no thanks, but only ingratitude.

“General Emilio Aguinaldo, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Colonel Marcelo H. del Pilar, and his private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba, arrived incognito in Singapore from Saigon on the 21st April, 1898. In Saigon, where Aguinaldo had remained for one week, he had interviews with one or two old Filipino friends now resident there. The special purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to consult other friends here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray, an old and intimate English friend for fifteen years resident in the Philippines, about the state of affairs in the islands generally. Particularly as to the possi-

bility of war between the United States and Spain, and whether in such an event the United States would eventually recognize the independence of the Philippines, provided he lent his co-operation to the Americans in the conquest of the country. The situation of the moment was this : that the conditions of the honorable peace concluded on the 14th of December, 1897, between President Aguinaldo, on behalf of the Philippine rebels, and H. E. Governor-General Primo de Rivera, on behalf of Spain, had not been carried out, although their immediate execution had been vouched for in that agreement. These reforms would have provided protection to the people against the organized oppression and rapacity of the religious fraternities, would have secured improved civil and criminal procedure in courts, and have guaranteed in many ways improvements in the fiscal and social conditions of the people. The repudiation by the Spanish Government of these conditions, made by General Primo de Rivera, now left the rebel leaders, who had for the most part gone to Hong Kong, free to act. And it was in pursuance of that freedom of action that Aguinaldo again sought counsel of his friends in

Saigon and Singapore, with a view to the immediate resumption of operations in the Philippines.

“Meantime Mr. Bray, whose assistance to this journal on matters connected with the Philippines has been very considerable, as our readers will have seen, was introduced by the editor of the *Singapore Free Press* to Mr. Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States, who was anxious, in view of contingencies, to learn as much as possible about the real condition of the Philippines. It was a few days after this that Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore, when he at once met his friends, including Mr. Bray.

“Affairs now becoming more warlike, Mr. Bray, after conversation with Mr. Spencer Pratt, eventually arranged an interview between that gentleman and General Aguinaldo, which took place late on the evening of Sunday, the 24th April, at ‘The Mansion,’ River Valley Road. There were present on that occasion General Emilio Aguinaldo y Fami, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, Consul-General United States of America, Mr. Howard W. Bray, Aguinaldo’s private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba, Colonel M. H. del Pilar, and Dr. Marcelino Santos.

“During this conference, at which Mr. Bray acted as interpreter, General Aguinaldo explained to the American Consul-General, Mr. Pratt, the incidents and objects of the late rebellion, and described the present disturbed state of the country. General Aguinaldo then proceeded to detail the nature of the co-operation he could give, in which he, in the event of the American forces from the squadron landing and taking possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order and discipline among the native troops and inhabitants, in the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenceless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare. He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles, and would be willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United States intend giving Cuba.

“The Consul-General of the United States, coinciding with the general views expressed during the discussion, placed himself at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral Dewey at Hong Kong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent in-

terchange of telegrams consequently took place. *

"As a result another private interview was arranged at the American Consular residence, at the Raffles Hotel, between General Aguinaldo, Mr. Spencer Pratt, Mr. Howard Bray, and Mr. Leyba, private secretary to General Aguinaldo.

"As a sequel to this interview, and in response to the urgent request of Admiral Dewey, General Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hong Kong by the first available steamer, the P. & O. Malacca, on Tuesday, the 26th April at noon, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain del Pilar, and Mr. Leyba, his private secretary.

"General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. † Amer-

* It was at this time that Consul Pratt telegraphed to Admiral Dewey, "Aguinaldo insurgent leader here. Will come Hong Kong arrange with Commodore for general co-operation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph."

Dewey's reply was: "Tell Aguinaldo come, soon as possible."

† Compare this with the statement in the preliminary report of the Philippine Commission after reference has

ican protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrious population of the country. There would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judicature of the country under experienced European law officers. Entire freedom of the press would be established, as well as the right of public meeting. There would be general religious toleration, and steps would be taken for the abolition and expulsion of tyrannical religious fraternities who have laid such strong hands on every branch of civil administration. Full provision would be given for the exploitation of the natural resources and wealth of the country by roads and railways, and by the removal of hinderances to enterprise and investment

been made to Aguinaldo's removal of his camp from Cavité to Bacoor under orders from Admiral Dewey: "now for the first time arose the idea of independence." This is a remarkable misstatement since the idea had been proclaimed to the world specifically through the medium of a newspaper before Aguinaldo came to Cavité. (Editor's italics.)

of capital. Spanish officials would be removed to a place of safety until opportunity offered to return them to Spain. The preservation of public safety and order and the checking of reprisals against Spaniards would, naturally, have to be a first care of the government in the new state of things."

The foregoing statement, taken in connection with the following article which appeared in the Singapore, China, *Free Press*, June 9, 1898, removes all doubt as to the nature of the understanding between Consul Pratt and the Filipino leaders :

"A little after five P.M., last evening, a numerous deputation, consisting of all the Filipinos resident in Singapore, waited upon the American Consul-General, Mr. Spencer Pratt, at his residence, and presented him with an address, congratulatory of the American successes in the present war, and expressive of the thanks of the Filipino community here for the aid now being given by the United States to the aspirations of the Filipino people for national freedom. There were also present Mr. W. G. St. Clair, editor of the Singapore *Free Press*; Mr. A. Reid, editor of the *Straits Times*, and Mr. Howard W. Bray,

whose active sympathies with the Filipino nation are so well known as to enable him to be styled 'Aguinaldo's Englishman.' Mr. Spencer Pratt and Mr. Bray both wore the badge of the Liga Philippina, presented to them by General Aguinaldo during his incognito visit to Singapore.

"After Mr. Bray had performed the ceremony of introducing the deputation to Consul-General Spencer Pratt, Dr. Santos, the chief Philippine refugee here, who has been educated at Barcelona and Paris, delivered the address, of which the following is a translation :

*"To the Honorable Edward Spencer Pratt,
Consul-General of the United States of
North America, Singapore :*

"SIR,—The Filipino colony resident in this port, composed of representatives of all social classes, have come to present their respects to you as the legitimate representative of the great and powerful American Republic, in order to express our eternal gratitude for the moral and material protection extended by Admiral Dewey to our trusted leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, who has been driven to take up arms in the name of eight millions of Filipinos in

defence of those very principles of justice and liberty of which your country is the foremost champion.

“ ‘Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.

“ ‘Our warmest thanks are especially due to you, sir, personally, for having been the first to cultivate relations with General Aguinaldo, and arrange for his co-operation with Admiral Dewey, thus supporting our aspirations which time and subsequent actions have developed and caused to meet with the applause and approbation of your nation.

“ ‘Finally, we request you to convey to your illustrious President and the American people and to Admiral Dewey our sentiments of sincere gratitude and our most fervent wishes for their prosperity.’

“The address, which was written in Spanish and read in French by Dr. Santos,

the spokesman, was replied to in French by Mr. Spencer Pratt, to the following effect:

“Gentlemen, the honor you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I cannot find appropriate words with which to thank you, with which to reply to the eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, however, that I fully understand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action, and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people, from whom I am sure that they will meet with full and generous response. A little over a month ago the world resounded with the praise of Admiral Dewey and his fellow-officers and men for a glorious victory won by the American Asiatic squadron in the Bay of Manila. To-day we have the news of the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, co-operating on land with the Americans at sea. You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Agui-

naldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion, and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavité. The rest you know. I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, which has resulted so happily. I can only hope that the eventual outcome will be all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos. My parting words to General Aguinaldo were, "General, when you have proved yourself great, prove yourself magnanimous," and from the generous treatment that we understand he has accorded to the Spanish prisoners, taken in the recent fight, he has done so.' (Applause.)

"Dr. Santos then, addressing his fellow-countrymen (Paysanos), called for successive vivas for the President of the United States, for Admiral Dewey, and for Consul-General Pratt; for England, the 'nation hospitalière,' and for the editors of the *Singapore Free Press* and *Straits Times*. Consul-General Pratt called for vivas for

General Aguinaldo and the Filipino people.

“Mr. Spencer Pratt subsequently presented an American flag to Dr. Santos for the Filipino deputation. ‘This flag,’ he said, ‘was born in battle, and is the emblem of that very liberty that you are seeking to attain. Its red stripes represent the blood that was shed for the cause, the white the purity of the motive, the blue field the azure of the sky, the stars the free and independent States of the Union. Take it, and keep it as a souvenir of this occasion.’

“On receiving the flag from the Consul’s hands, Dr. Santos called for three cheers for the American nation, waving the flag on high, and stating that the Filipinos would always cherish this emblem, which would be preserved for future generations to look upon with pride.”

The author has received a letter from Mr. Howard W. Bray which gives further light on this phase of the question. It is dated Labuan, N. Borneo, May 4, 1900, and is in part as follows :

“I am in receipt of yours of 2d March last, which has been forwarded me from Singapore. I have taken up a temporary

residence here pending settlement of troubles in the Philippines ; but as that unhappy country is farther off than ever from being pacified, I have now decided to settle down in the State of Brunei when his Highness the Sultan has given me certain land concessions which will eventually attract many of these Filipinos who wish to be free of American rule. Brunei is just across the Bay on the mainland of Borneo and populated by people of the same race as the Philippines, although professing Islamism ; yet having had 18 years' experience of the Malay races and studied their idiosyncrasies, their turn of thought, and mastered that racial individuality impossible to describe, I have come to the conclusion this is the best thing to do rather than face the chaos that is now reigning, and likely to reign, indefinitely in the Philippines under American rule. I regret extremely having to leave that beautiful country where I wished to live and die, but that charming simplicity, absolute confidence, unbounded hospitality, and gallantry so conspicuous among Filipinos of all classes from highest to lowest has received a blow from which it will never more recover, and their confidence in the white race has gone. Spain with all her faults

has never been guilty of the carnage and plunder which have followed in the wake of American 'benevolent assimilation.' The nation forsooth which came under the pretext of delivering the people from Spanish bondage !

* * * * *

“Re the interviews between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo, I cannot do better than send you also under registered cover the Singapore *Free Press* of 4 May, 1898, which gives in substance and fact very much the version of what happened. I must add, as an introduction, that some time before Aguinaldo's arrival in Singapore I had been in daily communication with Consul-General Spencer Pratt, furnishing him with information which one having my unique knowledge of the Philippines alone possessed, which was all passed on to Admiral Dewey. I knew the Spaniards had no torpedoes nor mines, information not possessed by any other foreigner. I had friends in Cavité arsenal who were patriotic Filipinos, and, as I enjoy the confidence of these people as no other white man, I was able to impart this (for Dewey) most important and vital information, and other of the same sort, such as a place where in case of necessity the American fleet could

obtain coal, etc., etc. I saw an autograph letter from Dewey to Pratt thanking him for his information, which he went on to say came in most welcome and *valuable at a time when reliable and valuable information was scarce and difficult to obtain*. I enclosed with my information a rough plan or two which were sent on to Dewey also. It was when in interviews with Pratt about this time that the latter urged me to do all I could to get Aguinaldo down to Singapore. After a lot of telegrams (paid by me), I prevailed on Aguinaldo to come down. Even then I had some trouble to persuade him and the members of his staff and head of the Filipino Committee that it would be better for them to join issue with the Americans rather than undertake independent action. Two or three, as it turns out now, far-seeing Filipinos were obstinate in their objections to this and advised a waiting policy ; allow the American fleet to destroy the Spanish, and then for the leaders of the late rebellion who were in Hong Kong to come over in a special steamer with arms, land at a point on the coast and finish with the Spaniards ; the rout of the latter would then have been more complete, and Dewey powerless to prevent it for want of men. The Spaniards

also would have willingly come to terms with the Filipinos, and the Philippines would not now be suffering this terrible affliction of having its homes and fair land ruined, and history would have had to chronicle otherwise. My influence, however, prevailed, and Aguinaldo consented to receive the visit of the American Consul-General, and in this visit Aguinaldo's policy and intentions and demands were clearly defined, under the following heads *drawn up by myself in consultation with Aguinaldo and his followers*. (See Aguinaldo's Policy at foot of page in *Free Press*.) The actual copy submitted I have not at hand at the moment, but the *Free Press* version is pretty nearly correct, and gives a general idea of the whole. You will notice first and foremost is *Filipino Independence*; that was a *sine qua non*, and the Filipinos undertook at first to seek the advice of European and American advisers (*but always appointed by themselves, not by America*). Let me add, the editor of Singapore *Free Press*—which is not a yellow but very sedate journal—was the only white man in Singapore outside myself and Pratt who had any communication with Aguinaldo and was cognizant of all that took place, and it was he who

introduced me to the Consul in the first instance. In this first interview Consul Pratt stated that he must communicate the result to Admiral (then Commodore) Dewey, and requested the favor of another interview when the latter's reply came. This took place at the Consulate in Raffles Hotel, when Mr. Consul Pratt stated he had received an urgent message from Dewey requesting Aguinaldo to proceed immediately to join him, of course *on the conditions laid down in the first interview*. In order to keep the arrangement secret, I was deputed to arrange for Aguinaldo and staff to get away to Hong Kong, and I took out their passage with the P. & O. S. S. Co. under assumed names. What took place afterwards has now passed into history and cannot be altered, however much Dewey and McKinley would like to do so. In confirmation of this arrangement, I also send you Singapore *Free Press* of 9 June containing the report of Mr. Pratt's reception of a Filipino deputation and accepting an address of congratulation. I was in the Editor's office when Consul Pratt himself supervised the reply he made before going into print. The address you will notice says 'We hope that the United States, your nation, will

efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this part of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.' Let any impartial man judge from this! It is no use for me to say any more. . . .

"Admiral Dewey's assertion that I am in the pay of the Filipino scouts, etc., is gratuitous on his part. Neither from them nor from America have I received one red cent; on the contrary I am a very heavy sufferer owing to my action to assist the United States. The Spaniards, infuriated at my action, destroyed property of mine on my estate in the south of Luzon to the value of \$15,000, all my personal effects, curios, and ethnographical and anthropological collection of 15 years, besides family heirlooms, etc., impossible to replace. Will the United States ever indemnify me for this loss? *Certainly not*; not even for the telegrams I am out of pocket by on her behalf."

NOTE IV.

THE SOVEREIGNTY PROCLAMATION.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 21, 1898.

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR :

SIR,—The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With the signature of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant, and as the result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In fulfilment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired, and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of

the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and Bay of Manila, is to be extended with all possible despatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the security of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the government of the United States to give effect to these beneficial purposes, will re-

ceive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity so far as may be possible.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

NOTE V.

GENERAL OTIS explains in his report why he censored the President's proclamation. He says :

“After fully considering the President's proclamation, and the temper of the Tagalos, with whom I was daily discussing political problems, and the friendly intentions of the United States Government towards them, I concluded that there were certain words and expressions therein, such as ‘sovereignty,’ ‘right of cession,’ and those which directed immediate occupation, etc., which, though most admirably employed and tersely expressive of actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the Tagalo war-party to incite widespread hostilities among the natives. The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that certain words, as ‘sovereignty’ ‘protection,’

etc., had a peculiar meaning disastrous to their welfare and significant of future political domination, like that from which they had recently been freed. It was my opinion, therefore, that I would be justified in so amending the paper that the beneficent object of the United States Government would be brought clearly within the comprehension of the people, and this conclusion was the more readily reached because of the radical change of the past few days in the constitution of Aguinaldo's government, which could not have been understood at Washington at the time the proclamation was prepared."

NOTE VI.

THE report of Wilcox and Sargent appeared in the Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin* of February 1, 1899, as a Washington despatch, as follows :

"The clearest and most accurate picture of conditions as they exist in the interior of the great island of Luzon, the largest of the Philippine group, with an area equalling that of the State of Virginia, that has yet

been presented to the official eye, is that set out in a report made to the Navy Department of the tour of two young American naval officers, Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Cadet R. L. Sargent, officers of Dewey's fleet. The achievement of these young naval officers has earned not only the praise of Dewey, but also of the officials here in Washington, to whom it has been submitted.

“Last October Paymaster Wilcox and Cadet Sargent, at the outset, were warned that they could not pass the lines of the Philippine forces without permission of Aguinaldo. Upon application to this leader at Malolos, his head-quarters, he first required a formal sanction of their request by Admiral Dewey and General Otis, or General McArthur, and later, when this was produced, declined altogether to issue a passport, although he assured the officers that they were free to proceed without molestation from his forces. Accordingly, a start was made October 5, with five servants, eight horses, and between three hundred and four hundred pounds of baggage, including a camp outfit, two rifles and a shot-gun, with ammunition.

“‘From Rosales to Humingan and thence

to San José our experiences of travel were much the same as those already described. Labor was cheap. Ten men could usually be engaged for a day for the sum of two dollars in silver, or less than ten cents in gold per man.

“ ‘Throughout this part of the province of Nueva Icaya almost the only form of agriculture encouraged at present by the natives is rice growing. A little sugar is raised. The land is rich ; we encountered no barren or unfertile spots. The fields at this season of the year are several inches deep in water. There was no timber of value along the direct line of our routes, but in the hills along the river Agno forests could be seen. There are very few forests, and practically no cattle. There was a great number of buffalo, and these are of extreme utility. The principal labor of the natives at this season of the year is the threshing of rice. This is done primitively with implements that resemble on a large scale the pestle and mortar of a chemist. The mortar is replaced by a section of a log of hard wood, hollowed out to receive the grains. The pestle by a hard club from four to five feet long and about six inches in diameter at each end.

“ ‘The Presidente and other local officials are native Filipinos. Most of them have received a certain amount of education at religious schools in Manila. They are intelligent men and are extremely eager to learn news from the outside world. Their knowledge of modern history and geography is extremely limited, and their ignorance of current events is surprising. We brought them their first definite information with regard to Cuba and to their own present status. One or two of them had heard of the Congress at Paris, but no one had any idea as to its object, nor as to its relation to themselves. They were well grounded on only three points,—the destruction of the Spanish squadron in Manila Harbor, the surrender of Manila, *and the declaration by the Philippine Government at Malolos, and of the independence of the Islands and the establishment of a republican form of government with Aguinaldo as president.* (Author’s italics.) Even on these points the details they had received were very inaccurate.’

* * * * *

“Leaving Carranglan the Presidente local insisted upon their taking a guard of twelve soldiers with a sergeant, “to protect us

against Igorrotes, or savages, that are said to infest the hills between this town and Aritao."

" "We arrived at Aritao shortly after sundown. A broad branch of the Rio Magat separated us from this town. There was a "banca," or native dug out canoe, however, in which men and baggage were taken to the other side, while the horses were swum across at a point higher up the stream. Of the timber which we have seen the most valued on the island is the "mulawe," so-called in both Spanish and Telga. This is a tall, straight tree with a very few branches; the bark is very light in color, but the wood is very dark and close grained and resists weather and water. It is much used for boats, and for the floors and exposed uprights of the houses. There is also much bamboo, some of which has been cut. The heavier trees are as yet unmolested. We saw no signs of savages nor of poisonous snakes, against which we had been warned by the natives of the district.

" "We spent the night at Bambang. We were accompanied by several soldiers and Lieutenant Aguinaldo. This was the first time that a commissioned officer had formed part of our escort. This town is the capi-

tal of the province, and has a population of about 12,000 inhabitants. At this place we met the first formidable opposition to our progress.

“ ‘From Bagagag to the next town, Cordón (called Estella on the map), there is only a mountain trail. This trail is infested at certain seasons by Igorrotes, who waylay and murder persons travelling in small and unarmed parties. Several murders have occurred here recently. Three small parties of natives with horses and buffaloes had been waiting at Bagagag for several days for a party to travel with a military escort. They joined us next day.

“ ‘During our detention at Carig we were not treated as prisoners; we were informed that if we wished to return to Manila by the same road we had followed in leaving it, we were at liberty to do so. Within the village itself we had, of course, entire liberty. We asked Señor Villa if the Philippine Republic intended to demand passports of the travellers, and used the same argument that had proved so efficient at Bayombong; he replied that it would be the custom only in time of war. He classed this period as a time of war, and the congress at Paris as a mere suspension of hos-

tilities, at the end of which their nation might be again enveloped in war. Our relations with Señor Villa were mainly official; his manner towards us was brusque, and at times discourteous. He was extremely suspicious of us, particularly of the diary that we kept from day to day, and of a camera that formed part of our equipment. He became slowly convinced, however, that we were not seeking for military information. After he had assured himself of this, he told us that the colonel feared that we were making maps of the country. During the rest of our journey we were entirely free from the taint of this suspicion. According to Señor Villa's statement, the charge had first been made by the *Spanish prisoners, who had never ceased to warn the natives that American troops would come into the province to conquer them, when they would find themselves in worse hands than before they rebelled against Spain.* (Author's italics.)

“ ‘In the streams, and particularly in the river Magat and the Rio Grande de Cagayan, there are many alligators, of which the natives are in great fear. No native will venture into the water or into the grass along the bank until he has first thrown stones in front of him to frighten away any

alligators which may be in the neighborhood.

“‘We arrived at Ilagan that evening, November 1st. This town is the capital site of the province of Isabella. It has a population of between ten and fifteen thousand inhabitants, and has many large wooden houses, roofed with corrugated iron, giving it rather a European appearance. It is well situated for defence, being at the junction of the river Pinananauan with the Rio Grande. It is protected by these wide streams from all points except the south. To attack the city by land from the south it would be necessary to bring troops by the eastern side of the Rio Grande, where there are no roads. The site of the city is raised, moreover, about forty feet above the level of the river. In this town we were entertained at the house of a wealthy citizen. *The first night after our arrival a ball was given in our honor, at which there were over fifty young ladies and an equal number of well-dressed and gentlemanly men. The ball was well conducted; the dances were Spanish. The next evening we were invited to the theatre to see two one-act Spanish comedies, presented by the society young people of the town. They were both excellently given,*

and spoke well for the intelligence of the players. (Author's italics.)

“ ‘We desired to continue our journey from Ilagan to Tuguegarao, and from that point across the mountains to the western coast. This request was wired by Señor Villa to Colonel Tirona, at Aparri. The officer replied that it would not be possible to make the proposed trip at this season of the year. He repeated his invitation to visit Aparri, taking a steamer from that port, disembarking at the northern point on the western coast, and continue our journey south by land. This arrangement was accepted as the most satisfactory one left open to us. *There are many Spanish prisoners in this town—civil officers, priests, soldiers. Eighty-four priests were paraded in the street for our inspection, only four or five of them wearing robes of their office. Nearly all of them wore long hair and beards. They appeared in good health, and we could detect no evidence of maltreatment. These prisoners have been assembled from different parts of the province. They are kept under stricter guard than either of the two other classes of prisoners, for the reason that the native officials fear that if permitted to go among the people they will use the influence*

they possess through their position in the Church to incite them against the Philippine government. We also met Don José Perez, a Spaniard, who had previously been governor of the island. He was well dressed, and seemed to be enjoying all the ordinary comforts. (Author's italics.)

“ ‘In these two days we passed out of the province of Labella, and entirely through the province of Cayagen. These are the leading tobacco provinces in the island. An idea of their wealth can be obtained from the fact that before the Philippine insurrection three million dollars in tobacco came yearly from the one province of Isabella. The tobacco of this province is preferred for exportation to that of Cayagen. Both provinces raise also sugar, rice, cocoa, and coffee. Cattle are shipped from Aparri.

“ ‘The steamer “Saturnas,” which had left the harbor the day before our arrival, brought news from Hong Kong papers that the Senators from the United States at the Congress at Paris favored the independence of the islands with an American protectorate. Colonel Tirona considered the information of sufficient reliability to justify him in regarding the Philippine independence as assured, and warfare in the island at an end. For this reason he proceeded to

relinquish military command he held over the provinces and to place this power in the hands of a civil officer, elected by the people. This officer also made a speech, in which he thanked the disciplined military forces and their colonel for the services they had rendered the provinces, and assured them that the war they had begun would be perpetuated by the people of the provinces, where every man, woman, and child stood ready to take up arms to defend their newly-won liberty, and resist to the last drop of their blood the attempt of any nation whatever to bring them back to their former state of dependence. His speech was impassioned. He then placed his hand on an open Bible and took the oath of office. (Author's italics.)

“‘We were hospitably entertained at Aparri ; two balls were given in our honor. The town has a population of 20,000 inhabitants. It has many handsome houses and several well-defined streets. The military force stationed here consists of three hundred soldiers, in addition to which the harbor has a protection of the gunboat “*Philippina*,” which carries two guns of a calibre of about three inches. There are no Spaniards here, with the exception of two or three merchants. One of these, representing the company of the steamer “*Saturnas*,” we

have met. He is pursuing his business entirely unmolested. (Author's italics.)

“ ‘We remained at Vigan all next day, November 12. It had rained during the night, rendering impassable a part of the road to the next town. We walked through the town and visited the house of several trades-people. At one of these houses we heard the first and only definite complaint which came to our ears during the entire journey on the part of the natives against the present government. These people complained of the taxes imposed upon them, and even went so far as to state that they preferred the Spanish Government. This statement was made in the presence of a party of six natives, and was acquiesced to by all : they were all, however, of the same family.

“ ‘In going from Tagudin to Bangan we passed from the province of Ilocus Sur into that of Union. The province of Ilocus Sur raises principally rice, tobacco, sugar, cattle, and sheep. The tobacco is of an inferior quality, being coarser and stronger than that raised in Isabella and Cayagen. The cultivation of cocoanuts is profitable, and is increasing. Goats and pigs are raised in great numbers. Many of the people are

engaged in the weaving of cotton, from which they make cloth, towels, etc.

“In the mountains there are mines of copper, sulphur, and gold; but these we have not seen. The streams are numerous, but many of them have very little current. They are crossed by a ferry; a bamboo raft, hauled across by means of a bamboo rope which spans the stream. Travelling on this road in rainy season is rather difficult. Carriages are usually used, but they are frequently mired and the passengers are compelled to walk. Carriages are drawn by either horses and steers or buffaloes, according to the state of the road.’ ”

THE END.

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